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The Broken Medicare Appeals System:
Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation
Greer Donley †
Abstract
The Medicare Appeals System is broken. For years, the System has been
unable to accommodate a growing number of appeals. The result is a
backlog so large that even if no new appeals were filed, it would take the
System a decade or more to empty. Healthcare providers wait many years
for their appeals to be heard before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and
because the government recoups providers’ Medicare payments while they
wait, the delays cause them serious financial harm. Even worse, providers
are more likely than not to prevail before the ALJ, proving that the payment
should never have been recouped in the first place. The financial pressure
on providers creates widespread reverberations in the healthcare market,
and consumers ultimately pay the price. Nevertheless, the government
appears unwilling or unable to fix the problem.
This Article explores how the System works, why the System broke, and
what legal or legislative remedy could solve its problems. The Article
articulates the central concern underlying the System’s backlog: small
providers lack the liquidity and revenue stream to endure the uncertainty
and delayed gratification that is now required to participate in the Medicare
Program. As a result, these companies collapse or are purchased by larger
providers—contributing to the consolidation of the healthcare market. An
optimal remedy would relieve the pressure small providers face; it could be
achieved by delaying the government’s ability to recoup Medicare
payments before the provider has received an ALJ determination. Though
legislative or administrative action could most easily accomplish this goal,
providers have asked the judiciary to step in where the government is
failing. Of the various legal challenges that providers have lodged against
the government to protest the System’s delays, the one most likely to help
small providers is under the Due Process Clause. This Article concludes that
a due process challenge—though difficult to win—could have merit and
might be small providers’ best chance of obtaining relief, at least in the
short term.
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Introduction
Over the past six years, the Medicare Appeals System (“System”), which
handles appeals from Medicare payment determinations, has experienced
extreme bureaucratic inefficiency. The problems began in 2010 when
Congress implemented a new Medicare auditing program. 1 This program
dramatically increased the number of appeals entering the System, but did
not expand the budget or modify the System’s structure to accommodate
the influx. 2 By the end of 2015, the Department of Health and Human
1.

See, Andrew Wachler and Jessica Forster, GAO Releases Report Outlining
Continued Inefficiencies with the Medicare Appeals System and the Increasing
Appeals
Backlog,
ABA,
https://www.americanbar.o
rg/publications/aba_health_esource/2015-2016/august/appealsbacklog.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018) and CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &MEDICAID SERVS., RECOVERY
AUDITING
IN
MEDICARE
IN
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2014
(2015).
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Dataand-Systems/MonitoringPrograms/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs/Recovery-AuditProgram/Downloads/RAC-RTC-FY2014.pdf [hereinafter RECOVERY AUDITING].

2.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-366,
MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE OPPORTUNITIES REMAIN TO IMPROVE APPEALS PROCESS 19-20
(2016) [hereinafter MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE].
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Services (“HHS”) admitted that the System was so backlogged that it could
take eleven years for the System’s Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) to
resolve the appeals pending before them, even assuming no new appeals
were filed. 3
This backlog has caused enormous delays. Though Medicare providers
are statutorily entitled to an ALJ determination within ninety days, the
average provider waits at least three years. 4 And as they wait, the
government recoups providers’ money as if it has already won—often
totaling millions of dollars per provider. 5 This early recoupment would be
justified by administrative efficiency if the underlying decisions were generally
correct, but in reality, a significant proportion of these recoupments are
erroneous and eventually returned. 6 Delays associated with the backlog
have hit small providers particularly hard. 7 Many small providers face
insolvency as they wait for an ALJ determination—a dynamic that
exacerbates systemic healthcare problems for consumers. Most notably, it
contributes to the consolidation of the healthcare market, which reduces
competition and increases prices.
Despite the government’s awareness of and attention to the situation,
HHS 8 has been unable to control the increasing number of appeals entering
the System. The agency has requested additional funding from Congress for
four years in a row, finalized a rule aimed at streamlining the System, and
lobbied for legislative solutions. 9 Nevertheless, Congress has failed to
increase the budget or legislate reforms. And there is little evidence that
the agency’s administrative reforms will impact the backlog in any
significant way.
Once it became clear that lobbying efforts were unlikely to be
successful, both large and small Medicare providers took their complaints
to the federal courts, pursuing different legal strategies that reflected their
various needs. These efforts largely failed early on, but starting in late 2015,
the courts became more receptive to these challenges. The litigation
3.

U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
HHS
PRIMER,
7,
https://www.hhs.gov/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf (last visited Mar.
26, 2018) [hereinafter HHS PRIMER].

4.

MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE, supra note 2, at 1, 10,18.

5.

Id. at 2.

6.

Id. at 69.

7.

See Hirschfield, Marc E. & Skapof, Marc, Healthcare Providers Face Increasing
Financial Pressure And Bankruptcy Risk, MONDAQ,(June 26, 2014),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/323360/Healthcare/H
ealthcare+Providers+Face+Increasing+Financial+Pressure+And+Bankruptcy+Risk.

8.

HHS is an umbrella agency that oversees many of the agencies at issue in this
Article.

9.

MEDICARE FEE FOR SERVICE, supra note 2, at 38-39; Medicare Program: Changes to the
Medicare Claims and Entitlement, 60 Fed. Reg. 4974 (Jan. 17, 2017).
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surrounding the System’s delays presents an interesting case study on how
the federal courts, though reluctant, can intervene when private parties,
agencies, and Congress cannot solve administrative problems on their own.
Unlike the legislature, however, the judiciary’s solutions are necessarily
limited by the nature of the relief sought. One provider group, for instance,
obtained a writ of mandamus, which ordered the government to empty the
backlog and comply with the System’s statutory deadlines. But mandamus
is an imperfect remedy: even if the writ reduces the backlog of appeals, it
will do so at the expense of small providers and further perpetuate some of
the problems associated with the System’s delays. A successful due process
challenge, on the other hand, could create an optimal remedy by relieving
the pressure small providers experience while waiting for an ALJ hearing.
This Article explores how the System became so backlogged, why
administrative solutions have failed, and what the best legal remedy could
be. In Section I, I explain the process by which CMS or its contractors initially
pay Medicare providers and subsequently identify and recoup overpayments.
In Section II, I explore the System as Congress initially envisioned it, how it
currently functions, and why it became so dysfunctional. Next, in Section III,
I discuss how the delays associated with the System’s backlog play into
problems that affect our healthcare market as a whole. Section IV then
discusses the various regulatory and legislative proposals, explaining why
these attempted solutions have failed, and how the agency or legislature
could create meaningful change.
Finally, in Section V, I explore two different kinds of legal challenges:
mandamus and due process. The former aims to force compliance with the
ninety-day statutory timeline, while the latter seeks to delay recoupment
until after an ALJ hearing. Though only mandamus has been successful thus
far, this Article argues a remedy in due process will provide more protection
for small businesses, and consequently, consumers. While small providers
have achieved some preliminary relief in their due process challenges, they
all settled their cases with the agency before the merits were reached. This
result is unsurprising given that small providers generally lack the financial
capacity or incentive to litigate the issue to finality. This section concludes
that a due process challenge has merit, and if small providers can overcome
the obstacles inherent in litigating a due process claim, it may present their
best chance at achieving the desired result absent legislative action.

I.

Billing Medicare: How CMS Pays and Reviews Medicare Claims

The government provides health insurance for individuals over sixtyfive or who live with disabilities through the Medicare program. 10 The
10.

An Overview of Medicare, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Nov. 2017),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-an-overview-of-medicare.
Medicare beneficiaries can choose to enroll in either Medicare or Medicare
Advantage (“MA”) health plans. Id. Private health insurers administer MA plans
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government is the largest single healthcare payer in the United States, and
as a result, it has a large and disproportionate influence on the healthcare
market. 11 Most healthcare providers and suppliers 12 treat at least some
Medicare patients, 13 though certain providers do not generally service any
Medicare enrollees (e.g. pediatricians) and others treat a
disproportionately high number Medicare beneficiaries (e.g., hospice
providers). 14 Providers can also refuse to accept Medicare patients and,
though it remains unusual, it is becoming more common for certain
providers to do so. 15
After treating a Medicare patient, a provider submits a claim for payment
to the government. If the government approves the claim, then the provider
receives compensation.16 In this way, Medicare functions like any health
insurer: it contracts with providers to treat its beneficiaries in exchange for

and the government pays private insurers to cover beneficiaries on behalf of the
government. Id.
11.

Tevi Troy, How the Government as a Payer Shapes the Health Care Marketplace,
AM.
HEALTH
POL’Y
INST,
http://www.americanhea
lthpolicy.org/Content/documents/resources/Government_as_Payer_12012015.
pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).

12.

In this Article, I use the term provider to include both providers and suppliers.
According to the statute: provider “means a hospital, critical access hospital,
skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home
health agency, hospice program, or, for purposes of section 1814(g) and
section 1835(e), a fund.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (2010). The statute defines
suppliers to “mean[], unless the context otherwise requires, a physician or
other practitioner, a facility, or other entity (other than a provider of services)
that furnishes items or services under this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(d) (2010).
Healthcare “providers” include hospitals and other healthcare facilities,
physicians’ groups, and product manufacturers to the extent their services or
products are accepted for Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP reimbursement, see
42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (2006).

13.

Thomas Beaton, Providers Seeing Even Mix of Public, Commercially Insured
PAYER
INTELLIGENCE
(Oct.
30,
2017),
Patients,
HEALTH
https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/providers-seeing-even-mix-ofpubliccommercially-insured-patients.

14.

Greg Bengel, Doctors Refuse to Accept Medicare Patients, HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (Aug.
https://www.healthitoutcomes.com/doc/doctors-refuse-to-accept9,
2013),
medicare-patients-0001.

15.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OPTING OUT OF MEDICARE AND/OR ELECTING TO
ORDER AND CERTIFY ITEMS AND SERVICES TO MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (Sept. 2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-LearningNetwork-MLN/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/SE1311.pdf; Melinda Beck,
More Doctors Steer Clear of Medicare, WALL ST. J. (July 29,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323971
204578626151017241898.

16.

See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(a) (2010).
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payment. 17 CMS, however, does not function as the insurer itself; rather, it
contracts with Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACs”) to perform
various insurance functions on its behalf. 18 For instance, MACs review
providers’ claims for payment and pay providers for approved claims. 19
When a provider submits a claim for payment, MACs conduct a
prepayment review to determine whether the claim meets Medicare’s
conditions of payment. 20 Contractors create a system that automatically
pays certain claims, automatically denies certain claims, and tags other
claims for additional review. 21 Whether a claim is automatically paid or
queued for further review is determined based on risk—i.e., contractors
determine that certain claims are at a high risk for overbilling and are
therefore reviewed more thoroughly before payment. 22 The vast majority
of claims are considered low-risk and may be paid automatically or semiautomatically with little oversight. 23 This assessment is called Non-Complex
Review because it does not evaluate the medical documentation
supporting the claim, but rather confirms certain conditions of payment are
met by computer systems or non-expert coders. 24 Such claims can be
automatically denied, for instance, if the provider submits the claim with
missing, or clearly incorrect information. 25 Factors such as device delivery
dates and length of stay requirements can also form a more substantive
basis to quickly reject or accept the claim. 26
17.

See What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-changeplans/decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2018).

18.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS,
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/MedicareLearning-NetworkMLN/MLNProducts/downloads/MCRP_Booklet.pdf (last updated Sept. 2016)
[hereinafter MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS].

19.

What
is
a
MAC,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/Medicare-Admi
nistrative-Contractors/What-is-a- MAC.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).

20.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL,
§3.2,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/
Guidance/Manuals/downloads/pim83c03.pdf (last updated Nov. 9, 2017)
[hereinafter MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL].

21.

Id. at §3.2.B.

22.

Id., at §3.2.1.

23.

See e.g., Gulfcoast Med. Supply v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Case
No. 8:04-CV-2610-T-26EAJ, 2005 WL 3934860 *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2005)
(citations omitted), aff’d 468 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[I]nitial payment for
services under Medicare is ordinarily made as long as the [Medicare] claim does
not contain glaring irregularities on its face.”).

24.

See MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 18.

25.

Id. at § 3.2.A.

26.

Id. at § 3.2.1.2.
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A small number of flagged claims, however, are reviewed under
Complex Review prior to payment; this involves a medical professional or
claims analyst analyzing the claim to ensure it is “for a service or device that is
medically reasonable and necessary.”27 Complex Review is not rote; it involves
an assessment of the claim’s medical documentation—such as physician
notes, medical charts, and diagnosis codes—by an expert reviewer. 28
Contractors reviewing these claims may request additional documentation
before approving or denying them. 29 Complex Review is time consuming
and expensive; contractors cannot use it to review every claim before
payment. Instead, contractors “target their efforts at error prevention to
those services and items that pose the greatest financial risk to the
Medicare program and that represent the best investment of resources.” 30
Contractors flag claims as high risk—and therefore conduct Complex
Review—for many reasons. For instance, the claim may be expensive,
frequently billed, or use a diagnosis or procedure code with a history of
incorrect billing. 31 Tracking claims in this way allows contractors to review
a small number of the riskiest claims in depth while still paying providers
quickly for the majority of their services. 32
The result of prepayment review—whether Non-Complex or
Complex—is called the Initial Determination. 33 If the Initial Determination
approves a claim, the provider is paid according to a price outlined by
federal law and regulations. 34 If the Initial Determination denies a claim, the
provider is not paid, but can resubmit it or challenge the denial through the
System. 35 Though the Initial Determination forms the basis of payment, it is
only the beginning of the government’s review. Following payment—often
many years later—different kinds of Medicare contractors or government
agencies can review claims again through post-payment audits. 36

27.

Id. at § 3.2.1.1.

28.

Id.

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id. at § 3.2.1.

33.

MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 20.

34.

See e.g., MEDICARE CLAIM REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 20; see e.g., MEDICARE
INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20.

35.

See infra Section II.

36.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 52. For an examination of the
different kinds of Medicare contractors, see Don Romano & Jennifer
Colagiovanni, The Alphabet Soup of Medicare and Medicaid Contractors, 27
HEALTH L. 6, 1 (2015). Some of the most extensive post-payment reviews are
conducted by the Medical Review Program, the Comprehensive Error Rate
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Post-payment review is typically Complex, involving a deep dive into
the medical documentation to determine whether each claim meets
Medicare requirements.37 Errors generally result from insufficient medical
documentation to support the intervention, medical documentation that
supports a different code than was billed, or lack of medical necessity in the
documentation submitted. 38 Like prepayment reviews, these post-payment
audits usually involve a review of certain high-risk claims as opposed to the
provider’s entire claim history. Because audits can occur up to three years
after payment, the government can target its reviews based on data from
an earlier payment year. 39 For example, in 2012, the government could
retrospectively analyze the 2010 payment data, find a suspicious uptick of
the billing for a certain procedure code, and then in 2013, conduct wideranging audits of providers’ use of that code in 2010. 40 When a postpayment auditor decides that the claim should never have been paid, the
government will issue an overpayment determination, which requires the
provider to repay the funds. 41
Post-payment review is a vital part of protecting the Medicare trust
funds. 42 Because MACs cannot review every claim before payment, postpayment review allows the government to retrospectively identify
incorrectly paid claims. 43 Returning these overpayments to the government
helps to ensure the sustainability of the Medicare program. 44 For instance,
in 2016, roughly eleven percent of Medicare claims were improper,
corresponding to roughly $41.1 billion in overpayments. 45 Without postTesting Program, the Recovery Audit Program, and the Office of the Inspector
General. MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 18.
37.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20.

38.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19.

39.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1.

40.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19, at 8-9.

41.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19.

42.

Medicare is paid for by two trust funds, which are supported through taxes and
premiums. See generally How is Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-medicare-is-funded/medicarefunding.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2016).

43.

MEDICARE CLAIMS REVIEW PROGRAMS, supra note 19.

44.

See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Accidental Administrative Law of the Medicare
Program, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 1, 130-32 (2015). Because Medicare
developed into a procurement program, the government developed mechanisms
to help it combat the inevitable fraud that developed. Id.

45.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 2016 IMPROPER
PAYMENTS
REPORT,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-CompliancePrograms/CERT/Downloads/MedicareFeeforService
2016ImproperPaymentsReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2018).
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payment review, that money would not have been returned to the
government. Post-payment audits can also help the government identify
fraud, or the intentional submission of false Medicare claims. 46 It is
important to remember, however, that overpayments are separate and
distinct from fraud. Fraud indicates that the provider knowingly deceived
the government, whereas an overpayment is the result of the provider’s
genuine mistake. 47 Even though the government’s ability to conduct postpayment review is vital, in recent years, the nature of post-payment audits
has shifted in two fundamental ways that raise questions about the
integrity of post-payment audits.
First, post-payment auditors have increasingly chosen to use
extrapolation in their reviews. Extrapolation allows auditors to review a
small sample of claims and then apply the findings to the provider’s entire
set of claims for that particular fiscal year (“FY”). 48 For example, assume
that a provider submitted—and received payment for—one thousand
inpatient hospital claims. 49 Assume further that the government decided to
audit these claims. If a post-payment auditor reviewed only twenty of them,
concluding that five of the twenty should not have been paid, 50 then the
provider must repay the government twenty-five percent of the payments
it received for all one thousand inpatient claims. In other words, the
reviewer will deem 250 claims as overpaid even though it only found five
claims deficient.
46.

The False Claims Act, for instance, requires the government to prove that a
provider knowingly submitted a false claim for payment. A person acts knowingly
under the Act if s/he “(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)
(2010).

47.

Medicare Overpayments, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLNProducts/downloads/overpaymentbrochure508-09.pdf [hereinafter
MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS].

48.

See Chaves County Home Health Servs. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
OIG Extrapolation in Medicare Compliance Review Triples Hospital’s
Overpayment, 22 REP. ON MEDICARE COMPLIANCE 20 (June 3, 2013).

49.

This example was chosen intentionally. RACs have focused a great deal of
attention on inpatient claims. Hospitals are paid more for inpatient claims than
observation claims. If a RAC concludes that a hospital should have observed a
patient rather than admitted the patient, then the whole claim is deemed an
overpayment, even though the hospital would have been eligible for a portion of
that payment had it initially billed the government for observation. This surprising
result has been challenged unsuccessfully in federal court. Bagnall v. Sebelius, No.
3:11CV1703, 2013 WL 5346659 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2013).

50.

For instance, the review could determine that the patients should not have been
admitted, but rather kept in observation, which the government reimburses at a
lower rate to the hospital. See discussion in supra notes 52.
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This tactic allows the government to commit fewer resources to its
audits while at the same time recouping more money. 51 Providers,
however, can face enormous financial consequence as a result of these
extrapolated audits. 52 Providers have sued on this issue, claiming that the
government should not use extrapolation, or at the very least, should be
required to use the most accurate statistical modeling. 53 Courts have not
been persuaded. Instead, courts have deferred to the agency to dictate the
procedures of their audits. 54 The use of extrapolation itself is less
concerning than the fact that the agency is not held accountable to the
statistical methods it utilizes, even if it adopts second-tier methods with big
financial impact. 55
Second, Congress created the Recovery Audit Program (“RAP”),
implemented in 2010, which generated a new type of post-payment audit
and increased the number of post-payment reviews. 56 The RAP designated
Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”) to conduct RAP audits. 57 By statute,
RACs are paid on a contingency fee—i.e., they collect a portion of the

51.

DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016, (Jan. 2017),
https://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/FY2016-hcfac.pdf

52.

See e.g., Am. Health Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“This problem
takes a particular toll on hospitals with a large share of patients who rely on
Medicare”); Press Release, Am. Orthotic Prosthetic Ass’n, Study: Medicare Audit
“Mess” Surging At Rate Of 15,000 New Appeals Per Week, Agency Could Avoid
Rapidly Mounting Interest Payments, (Mar. 19,
2015),
http://www.aopanet.org/2015/03/study-medicare-audit-mess-surging-at-rateof-15000-new-appeals-per-week-agency-could-avoid-rapidly-mounting-interestpayments/[hereinafter Press Release].

53.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20.

54.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (2010) (authorizes Medicare contractors to use
extrapolation to determine overpayment amounts when the Secretary
determines that, “there is a sustained or high level of payment error or
documented educational intervention has failed to correct the payment error.”
Once this threshold finding is made, the provider has no means of challenging it.)
Gentiva Healthcare v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 292, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

55.

Plaintiffs have been unsuccessful at challenging the validity of the sampling and
extrapolation method—courts have held that CMS or its contractor need not
undertake the most precise sampling methodology so long as the method used is
statistically valid. In the Case of Michael King, No. M.-10-321, 2011 WL 6960267,
at *10 (May 10, 2011); Martin v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 114 F.Supp.3d
549, 572 (E.D. TN 2014); Pruchniewski v. Leavitt, No. 8:04-CV-2200-T-23TBM, 2006
WL 2331071, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2006).

56.

Facts About The Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013, AM. HOSP. ASS’N, 2
(2014), http://www.aha.org/content/13/fs-hr1250rac.pdf [hereinafter AM.
HOSPITAL ASS’N ].

57.

Kinney, supra note 47, at 130-32.
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overpayments they identify. 58 CMS currently pays RACs between nine and
twelve and a half percent of the overpayments they identify, based on a
competitive bidding process. 59 However, for certain kinds of audits, CMS
has increased that percentage to seventeen and a half percent. 60
This incentive structure has caused providers alarm, and many see RACs
as “bounty hunters” looking for overpayments at the expense of physicians
and hospitals. 61 Members of Congress have similarly expressed discomfort
with the financial incentives imbedded within the RAP. In a letter to the
Secretary of HHS, these Congressmen stated: “due to this payment
structure, RACs are incentivized to deny claims, even when the claims are
correct.” 62 Moreover, the time and expense providers must incur in hosting
auditors and gathering medical documentation further antagonizes the
relationship between RACs and providers. 63 Expenses associated with RAC
audits and appeals can exceed $100,000 per audit for many hospitals. 64
Nevertheless, the RAP has been very successful for CMS: in 2014, RACs
identified $2.39 billion in overpayments. 65 But RAC audits also dramatically
increased the number of “overpaid” claims that are later overturned
through the Medicare Appeals System. 66 According to the American
Hospital Association (“AHA”), RACs deem nearly half of the claims they
review to be invalid overpayments. Of the RAC determinations that are
58.

Id. (“RACs are paid by CMS on a ‘contingency fee’ basis, which means they are paid
a commission on each claim that they deny. RACs are currently reimbursed 9-12.5
percent of the Medicare payments they deny.”); Hospital Survey Report: The Real
Cost of the Inefficient Medicare RAC Program, AM. HOSP. ASS’N., 2 (2015),
http://www.aha.org/content/15/hospsurveyreport.pdf [hereinafter Hospital
Survey Report].

59.

Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,044 (Nov.
10, 2010).

60.

Medicaid Program; Announcement of Medicaid Recovery Audit Contractors
(RACs) Contingency Fee Update, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,127, 11,127 (Feb. 24, 2012).

61.

AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, supra note 57 (“Hospitals Need a Level Playing Field with RAC
Bounty Hunters”); AM. MED. ASS’N, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION FACT SHEET MEDICARE
RECOVERY
AUDI
CONTRACTOR
(RAC)
PROGRAM
APPEALS,
https://resourcesforrisk.com/_defa
ult/download/download_free_doc.php?file=Recovery+Audit+Contracto
rs+Fact+Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) (“The AMA remains deeply opposed
to utilization of contingencies for RACs since it is a bounty hunter-like program
that creates a financial incentive for RACs to identify overpayments.”).

62.

Letter from Members of Congress, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Department
of Health and Human Services (Feb. 10, 2014) available at:
http://www.aha.org/content/14/140210-let-congress-hhs.pdf.

63.

Hospital Survey Report, supra note 58, at 3-4.

64.

AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 57.

65.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1, at 13.

66.

AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 57.
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appealed, some estimate that more than seventy percent are overturned
on appeal. 67 Because of the high reversal percentage and the contingency
fees paid to contractors, only $1.6 billion of the $2.39 billion in RACidentified overpayments were returned to the Medicare trust fund in
2014. 68 Fortunately, when a RAC’s overpayment determination is
overturned, RACs must repay the contingency fee. 69
The nature of Complex post-payment review makes bias particularly
problematic. One of the most subjective conditions of payment that
contractors review is medical necessity. 70 Medical necessity review involves
a complex, fact-based assessment, where Medicare contractors—looking
for flaws—can scrutinize medical documentation with the benefit of
hindsight to identify services they deem medically unnecessary. 71 The
reviewer can second-guess the medical judgment of the doctor even if she
is not a physician herself or in the same specialty as the original physician. 72
Other requirements are equally frustrating for providers. For instance,
providers may need to wait a certain number of months from the patient’s
initial complaint before ordering certain interventions, see a patient faceto-face, or record specific facts about the patient in the medical chart to
justify ordering a test or procedure. 73 The list is extensive and many of these
regulations are technical and constantly changing. 74
In Caring Hearts Personal Home Services v. Burwell, the Tenth Circuit
questioned the complexity and number of CMS regulations. 75 The court
wondered whether Medicare laws have become so byzantine that the
agency has lost control of them.76 In this case, the plaintiff challenged a
Medicare appeals determination within the Medicare Appeals System. 77 The
67.

Id. at 5; Lisa A. Eramo, RAC Appeals: Should You Bother?, 25 FOR THE RECORD 10, 14,
(July 2013), http://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/0713p14.shtml.

68.

RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1.

69.

Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,039 (Nov.
10, 2010).

70.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 27-28.

71.

Id. at 65.

72.

AM. AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N, supra note 57 (“Despite protests by the AMA that RAC
audits involving complex medical reviews be performed by a physician of the same
specialty and the same of the physician under review” RACs will use “nurses,
therapists, and certified coders to review claims.”).

73.

MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 34.

74.

See CMS, ICD-10-CM OFFICIAL GUIDELINES FOR CODING AND REPORTING FY 2018,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/ICD10/Downloads/2018-ICD-10-CMCoding-Guidelines.pdf (last visited March 24, 2018).

75.

Caring Hearts Pers. Home Servs. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 968, 976-77 (10th Cir. 2016).

76.

Id.

77.

See id.
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provider argued that regulations it allegedly failed to meet were not in effect
when the claims at issue were submitted; instead, it claimed, the reviewer
erroneously applied regulations implemented in 2013 to 2010 claims. 78 The
court agreed and chastised the agency and the four arbiters in the System
for failing to keep track of the rules it promulgated:
This case has taken us to a strange world where the government itself—
the very “expert” agency responsible for promulgating the “law” no
less—seems unable to keep pace with its own frenetic lawmaking. A
world Madison worried about long ago, a world in which the laws are “so
voluminous they cannot be read” and constitutional norms of due
process, fair notice, and even the separation of powers seem very much
at stake. But whatever else one might say about our visit to this place,
one thing seems to us certain: an agency decision that loses track of its
own controlling regulations and applies the wrong rules in order to
penalize private citizens can never stand. 79

This case highlights the expanding regulatory burden that Medicare
providers face. Providers must keep track of the government’s voluminous
and expanding regulations to defend their right to compensation for the
services they provide. The government can review their claims
retrospectively using post-payment auditors that have known conflicts of
interest. And with extrapolation, a mistake on one claim can cost providers
millions of dollars, even if the physician provided the services in good faith.
These flaws do not call for an elimination of post-payment audits, but
underscore the paramount need for fair appeals with sufficient procedural
protections to mitigate any risk of abuse. As explored below, it is not clear
that providers are sufficiently protected by the System as it functions today.

II.
A.

The Medicare Appeals System

Statutory Framework for Medicare Appeals

The process for appealing a Medicare overpayment determination
involves four steps: Redetermination, Reconsideration, ALJ hearing, and
Department of Appeals Board (“DAB”) Review. 80 MACs and Qualified
Independent Contractors (“QICs”), which are both Medicare contractors
paid by CMS, render the first two levels of review (Redetermination and
78.

Id. at 970

79.

Id.

80.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (2010); see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PARTS
A & B. APPEALS PROCESS,
3,
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-andEducation/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLN
Products/downloads/MedicareAppealsprocess.pdf (last updated June 2017)
[hereinafter MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM].
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Reconsideration respectively). 81 By contrast, the Office of Medicare
Hearings and Appeals (“OMHA”), which employs the ALJs and DAB
members, is located outside CMS and is therefore more independent from
the agency. 82 These four steps of appeal constitute the Medicare Appeals
System, and only after a provider proceeds through them can they
challenge the overpayment determination in federal court. 83
CMS’s recoupment authority is tied to the System. After CMS conducts a
post-payment review and renders an overpayment determination, the
government issues a demand letter.84 The letter gives the provider thirty days
upon receipt to lodge an appeal against some, or all, of the post-payment
review results. 85 Post-payment audit results that are not challenged within
thirty days are subject to immediate recoupment. 86 If a provider challenges
the audit, however, the appeal enters the System, and the government
cannot recoup those payments until after Reconsideration and
Redetermination. 87 CMS may, however, recoup overpayments before the
ALJ determination, even if the Reconsideration decision is being appealed
to the ALJ. 88 Recoupment allows the government to either demand
repayment or to withhold future payments from providers to compensate
the debt. 89
The statute creating the System requires completion of each step in the
appeals process within a certain timeframe. Redetermination and
Reconsideration must be completed within sixty days of the provider’s
request for the corresponding level of appeal. 90 An ALJ must render a
determination within ninety days of the provider’s initial request for
review. 91 Within this timeframe, the ALJ must conduct and conclude its
81.

MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 80, at 6-7; MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra
note 20, at 4.

82.

OMHA is housed under HHS, but not under CMS. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3.

83.

Statutes prohibit parties from challenging an appeal in court before completing all
four steps in the administrative appeals process. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2010).

84.

MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.

85.

Id.

86.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., LIMITATION ON RECOUPMENT (935) FOR PROVIDER,
PHYSICIANS
AND
SUPPLIERS
OVERPAYMENTS
(Sept.
29,
2008),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLNMattersArticles/Downloads/MM6183.pdf [hereinafter LIMITATION ON
RECOUPMENT].

87.

Id.; MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.

88.

Id.

89.

MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.

90.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a)(3)(C) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C) (2010); see MEDICARE
APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 84.

91.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2010).

282

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

hearing and render a decision. 92 The fourth step—DAB review—must also
be completed within ninety days of the provider’s request for it. 93 As
explored below, these timelines have become meaningless and the System
no longer functions as it was designed.
Name
Arbiter
Deadline
Post-Payment Review Finds an Overpayment, and the Provider Wants
to Appeal
Step One
Redetermination
MAC (under CMS)
60 days
Step Two

Reconsideration

QIC (under CMS)

60 days

CMS May Begin Recoupment within 30 Days of the Reconsideration
Decision
Step Three Determination by ALJ
ALJ (under OMHA)
90 days
Step Four Determination by DAB

DAB (under OMHA)

90 days

Provider May Challenge the Overpayment in Federal Court
B.

The System in Practice: Then and Now

Until 2010, the System largely functioned according to the statutory
deadlines. 94 Prior to 2010, processing the ALJ hearing and determination
took an average of ninety-five days. 95 When providers receive timely
decisions, the financial burden associated with erroneous recoupment is
less significant because the government reimburses the provider quickly—
i.e., the provider is not deprived access to its funds for long. 96 Further, when

92.

Id.

93.

42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(2)(A) (2010).

94.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-366, MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE: OPPORTUNITIES
REMAIN
TO
IMPROVE
APPEALS
PROCESS
69
(2016),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677034.pdf [hereinafter GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE];
Adjudication Timeframes, Dep’t Health & Human Services., Office of Medicare
Hearings
&
Appeals
(last
updated
Apr.
29,
2015),
http://www.hhs.gov/omha/impor
tant_notice_regarding_adjudication_timeframes.html
[hereinafter
Adjudication Timeframes].

95.

See Adjudication Timeframes, supra note 94.

96.

When the hearing and determination occurs as the statute requires, then an
erroneous denial would deny providers funds for a maximum of five months:
providers have 60 days to lodge their appeal and ALJs have 90 days to render a
decision. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2010). In practice, this is much shorter given
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the System functions according to the statutory timeline, it properly
balances the government’s interest in collecting valid overpayments against
providers’ harm in having their payments erroneously recouped.
When CMS implemented the RAP in 2010, it caused a dramatic increase
in appeals entering the System, clogging it up. There are two reasons that
the RAP caused an influx of appeals: first, there were simply more postpayment audits for providers to challenge, and second, providers were
more likely to challenge RAC findings because they were suspicious of RACs’
financial incentives. 97 When Congress created the RAP, it did not expand
OMHA’s budget to accommodate the predictable increase in appeals, 98 and
as a result, providers blame this program for the System’s ballooning
delays. 99 CMS concedes that this program has significantly contributed to
the increase in appeals, but also points to other factors that have played a
role—such as the aging of the baby boomers, which increased the number
of Medicare beneficiaries (and therefore the number of claims CMS needs
to review, which can be appealed). 100
Providers are particularly troubled by the delays associated with step
three of the System, where they receive an ALJ hearing. Between 2009 and
2014, “the number of requests for an ALJ hearing or review increased
1,222%,” 101 but the budget for OMHA, the office responsible for Medicare’s
ALJ appeals, increased by only sixteen percent from 2010 to 2014. 102 By
the end of 2015, OMHA received “more than a year’s worth of appeals
every eighteen weeks.” 103 Assuming it received no new appeals, it would
take OMHA eleven years to work through the backlog of appeals. 104 And the
“backlog shows no signs of abating as the number of incoming appeals
continues to surpass the adjudication capacity at Levels 3 and 4.” 105 As of
that recoupment often does not start immediately, see 42 U.S.C.
§1395fff(a)(3)(C)(ii) and § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2010).
97.

AM. HOSP. ASS’N, supra note 57, at 2; see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94,
at 15.

98.

See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 15.

99.

Christopher Cheney, RAC Reforms Leave Providers Skeptical, MEDPAGE TODAY (Jan.
19,
2015),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/public
healthpolicy/medicare/49612.

100. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3.
101. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement, Medicare
Advantage Organization Determination, and Medicare Prescription Drug
Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures, 81 Fed. Reg. 43,790, 43,792 (July 5,
2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 401, 405, 422).
102. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 20.
103. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 7.
104. Id. at 3.
105. Id. at 41, at 7; OFFICE OF MEDICARE HEARINGS & APPEALS, JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES
FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE – FISCAL YEAR 2016 6 (2015).
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September 1, 2017, nearly 600,000 appeals are pending at OMHA 106 and
OMHA only has capacity to hear 77,000 appeals per year. 107 By 2021, the
government expects that there will be nearly one million pending appeals
before OMHA, even taking into account all of the agency’s efforts to reduce
the backlog. 108 OMHA currently resolves appeals within an average of three
years 109—already eleven times longer than permitted—but “some alreadyfiled claims could take a decade or more to resolve.” 110
Despite this enormous wait to receive an ALJ hearing, providers find ALJ
review to be the most important of the System’s four steps. According to
the Government Accountability Office, providers succeed at overturning
challenged denials more than half of the time. 111 In 2014, for instance, ALJs
fully reversed overpayment determinations in fifty-four percent of
appeals. 112 In previous years, ALJ reversal rates were over sixty percent. 113
And certain providers are historically even more successful before ALJ. 114
Two factors, explored in more depth below, explain the high reversal rate:
ALJ review is the first time providers (1) receive an evidentiary hearing and
(2) are heard before truly neutral arbiter.
Even though an ALJ is more likely than not to find that an alleged
overpayment was valid, CMS still recoups and withholds those payments
from providers while they wait years for an ALJ hearing. 115 Though the
government must repay the erroneously recouped payment if the provider

106. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C.
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
107. Medicare Program Changes, 81 Fed. Reg. at 43, 792.
108. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C.
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
109. Workload Information and Statistics—Average Processing Time by Fiscal Year,
DEP’T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.
(May
24,
2017),
www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/omha/about/current-workload/averageprocessing-time-by-fiscal-year/index.html; see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867
F.3d. at 171 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Henderson, J. dissenting).
110. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 867 F.3d at 163; see also Am. Health Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d
183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“These figures suggest that at current rates, some
already-filed claims could take a decade or more to resolve.”); see also MEDICARE
OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47.
111. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 20.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 69.
114. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
American Hospital Association[] reported that they had appealed 52% of RAC
denials, and that 66% of these appeals were successful.”).
115. Press Release, supra note 52.

285

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

prevails, this is of little benefit to providers whose businesses cannot
survive the years-long wait. 116
Small healthcare providers, which have less liquidity and tolerance for
missing revenue, have been the most notable victims of this process. 117 The
American Orthotic Prosthetic Association has stated that “small health care
providers like orthotic and prosthetic firms have been ‘unable to deal with
being bombarded by the uncertainty resulting from long-delayed [RAC]
appeals for disputed Medicare payments.’” 118 The Association highlighted
that the pressure from the appeals backlog have forced over one hundred
small health care businesses “to close their doors” and that “many more
are in danger of being shuttered.” 119 Larger providers, like hospital chains,
can weather these delays and do not face the same threat. 120 But regardless
of their size, all providers argue that the System’s delays harm patients
because their money is tied up in appeals when it could be used for patient
care. 121
The statute offers providers one recourse for the delays: escalation.
Escalation allows providers to proceed to the next stage of the appeal when
the agency exceeded its deadline in the previous stage. 122 So if it takes
longer than ninety days to receive an ALJ hearing, providers are statutorily
entitled to skip the ALJ hearing and move to DAB review. 123 This remedy,
however, requires a big sacrifice. First, the DAB is only required to provide
an evidentiary hearing if an “extraordinary question” is at issue; therefore,
escalating beyond an ALJ requires most providers to forfeit their only
116. Press Release, supra note 52.
117. Press Release, supra note 52; Jessica L. Gustafson and Abby Pendleton, Medicare
Appeals Adjudication Delays: Implications For Healthcare Providers And Suppliers,
26 No. 5 HEALTH L.. 26, 28 (2014) [hereinafter Gustafson and Pendleton] (“Of
particular importance, the delay in appeals adjudication results in significant cash
flow issues for appellants. These cash flow interruptions can be particularly
troublesome for smaller providers and suppliers faced with significant
overpayment demands resulting from post-payment audits.”).
118. Press Release, supra note 52.
119. Id.
120. See Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5104.
121. See e.g., Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38 (“Because of the consequent financial
burden, some providers are ‘forced . . . to reduce costs, eliminate jobs, forgo
services, and substantially scale back,’ all of which affects the quality and quantity
of patient care.”); D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, 156 F.Supp. 3d 798, 815 (W.D. La.
Jan. 12, 2016); see Hospice Savannah v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL
8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015).
122. Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, Reimbursement & Exclusion, SHARP & COBOS
http://sharpcobos.com/expertise/medicare-and-medicaid-reimbursement/ (last
visited Mar. 23, 2018).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(c)(3)(C)(ii) (2010); Adjudication Timeframes, supra note 94.
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opportunity for an evidentiary hearing by a neutral arbiter. 124 Second, the
fourth level of appeal, DAB review, is equally backlogged and thus
escalation from the ALJ only lands providers into another long queue. 125
Finally, escalating beyond both the ALJ and the DAB—straight into federal
court—creates a different problem. Federal courts will generally give
deference to the last agency determination on the record, which invariably
found for the government.126 As a result, escalation as a remedy would deprive
most providers their best chance to overturn the government’s overpayment
determination.127
The Medicare Appeals System no longer functions as it was designed.
It cannot accommodate the number of appeals entering it, and providers
are paying the consequences for the government’s bureaucratic failure.
Delays deprive providers of access to their money while they wait for an ALJ
hearing—a hearing that is more likely than not to prove that the money was
wrongfully deprived. In the meantime, small providers in particular suffer
serious financial consequences, facing insolvency as their money is
temporarily deprived. And any administrative remedy available to them
comes with serious sacrifice. But these harms extend beyond small
providers. As explored in the next section, the financial implications of the
System’s delays are passed onto consumers in various ways.

III.

Impact of the System’s Delays on Consumers and the Broader
Healthcare System

This Article has focused thus far on the consequences providers face
due to the System’s delays. But the consequences exceed far beyond the
providers’ experiences. These delays perpetuate systemic problems in the
healthcare market, which in turn affect the healthcare that patients receive.
In this section, I argue that the System’s delays cause four foreseeable
effects: (1) the delays contribute to a consolidation of the healthcare
market as small healthcare providers face insolvency and pressure to sell
their practices to larger providers; (2) the regulatory burdens perpetuate
providers’ frustration with Medicare, which could cause more providers to
opt out of Medicare; (3) the lack of access to funds causes providers to cut
patient services to accommodate short-term resource constraints; and (4)
the increased scrutiny resulting from post-payment review may influence
providers to make conservative treatment decisions.

124. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
125. Id. at 186.
126. Id. at 191.
127. Id.
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First, small healthcare providers are disproportionately impacted by
the financial hardships the System’s delays cause. 128 Large providers, like
hospital chains, can spread risk across numerous institutions—if a company
owns one hundred hospitals with a $100 million combined operating
budget, its operations will not be heavily affected if one hospital’s postpayment review ties up $5 million in the System. 129 It simply has enough
liquidity to endure the delay in getting a portion of that money back after
the ALJ determination. Small providers, on the other hand, can face
bankruptcy because of one or two bad audits. 130 If an orthotic manufacturer
with a $2 million operating budget is audited, and $400,000 of its revenue
gets tied up in appeals, then it will struggle to continue business as usual as
it waits. 131 This threat increases pressure on small providers to consolidate
with larger chains to compete in the market. 132 And if the small businesses
fold entirely, competition in the healthcare market also decreases.
Furthermore, if small providers are forced to close their businesses in rural
or underserved areas, then large providers may not fill in those gaps,
causing those locations to become healthcare deserts.
Recent consolidation of the healthcare market is a well-documented
problem. 133 Hospital chains are buying up smaller hospitals, insurance
128. Press Release, supra note 52; Gustafson and Pendleton, supra note 117 (“Of
particular importance, the delay in appeals adjudication results in significant cash
flow issues for appellants . . . These cash flow interruptions can be particularly
troublesome for smaller providers and suppliers faced with significant
overpayment demands resulting from post-payment audits.”).
129. See e.g., NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS OF SMALL
FIRMS
8
(2010),
available
at:
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Regulatory%2
0Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full).pdf
(“Considering
all
federal
regulations . . . [compliance c]osts per employee thus appear to be at least 36
percent higher in small firms than in medium-sized and large firms . . . . This is the
familiar empirical phenomenon known as economies of scale, and its impact is to
provide a comparative cost advantage to large firms over small firms.”).
130. See D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 815; see Hospice Savannah v. Burwell, No.
4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015); CTR FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID
SERVICES,
PROGRAM
HISTORY
AND
AUTHORITIES,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/MonitoringPrograms/recovery-audit-program-parts-c-and-d/Program-History-andAuthorities.html (last updated May 12, 2017).
131. Jessica L. Gustafson & Abby Pendleton, supra note 117.
132. See Statement, Paul B. Ginsburg, Professor and Director of Public Safety,
University of Southern California, Health Care Market Consolidations: Impacts on
Costs, Quality and Access (March 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/Ginsburg-California-Senate-Health-Mar-16-1.pdf.
133. See Abbe R. Gluck, Symposium: The New Health Care Industry—Consolidation,
Integration, Competition In The Wake Of The ACA, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 24,
2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/02/24/symposium-the-new-healthcare-industry-consolidation- integration-competition-in-the-wake-of-the-aca/;
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companies are merging, and service providers are joining forces. 134 As of
2012, two dialysis companies owned over seventy percent of the national
market. 135 This consolidation negatively impacts consumers because
competition disappears, driving up prices, while innovation and patient
choice falls. 136 National healthcare costs are rising, in part, because of this
market contraction:
Rising health care costs are a matter of national alarm, and increasing
attention has been paid to the growing market power accumulated
by health care providers . . . . Moreover, much of the recent rise in
health care costs is directly attributable to increases in supply-side
market power that are products of hospital consolidations and the
growth of provider collaborations.137

Even more concerning is the fact that large healthcare providers have
signaled their intention to use the savings from the 2017 tax reform law to
consolidate the market further. 138
The healthcare market has constricted in recent years for a variety of
reasons unrelated to the System. 139 But the System’s delays add another
source of pressure to consolidate. If a small provider faces insolvency as it
waits for an ALJ determination, an easy solution is to sell its business to a
larger provider who may be looking to increase its market share in a
particular region or over a new product. 140 In this way, small providers fall
Paul Ginsburg, Health care market consolidations: Impacts on costs, quality and
access, BROOKINGS INSTT. (March 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
testimonies/health-care-market-consolidations-impacts-on-costs-quality-andaccess/.
134. Id.
135. Two Thriving Dialysis Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/29/us/two-thriving-dialysiscompanies.html?_r=1&.
136. See Ginsburg, supra note 134.
137. Barak D. Richman, Antitrust And Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return To Basics,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 125 (2007).
138. See Caroline Humer and Carl O’Donnell, U.S. Pharma Executives Expect Deals to
Pick
Up
After
Tax
Overhaul,
REUTERS
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-conference-deals/u-s-pharmaexecutives-expect-deals-to-pick-up-after-tax-overhaulidUSKBN1EY28E?wpisrc=nl_health202&wpmm=1; Bob Herman, Health Care
Companies Are Thrilled About The Tax Overhaul, AXIOS (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/health-care-companies-are-thrilled-about-the-tax-ov1515474626-1dfb8877-d64d-4d3e-a90b3ac8782a62f0.html?wpisrc=nl_health202&wpmm=1.
139. Gluck, supra note 133; see Ginsburg, supra note 134.
140. See BakerHostetler, Healthcare Providers Face Increasing Financial Pressure and
JDSUPRA.COM
(June
13,
2014),
Bankruptcy
Risk,
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victims to a regulatory system that favors larger businesses that can
withstand near-term financial loss. This is not the only instance where the
government has been accused of incentivizing consolidation to consumers’
detriment. 141
Second, the System’s delays may also increase the tendency for small
providers to opt out of Medicare. 142 Many providers view the backlog as
another instance of regulatory burden and providers have started to opt
out of Medicare at higher rates. 143 Though the government need not
disclose the percentage of doctors that refuse to cover Medicare
patients, 144 some data exists for earlier years. From 2009-2012, the number
of physicians that opted out of Medicare more than doubled. 145 Twentyeight percent of family doctors have stopped accepting new Medicare
patients. 146 Providers reported that Medicare’s lower reimbursement rate
and administrative burdens largely created this phenomenon. 147
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/healthcare-providers-face-increasing-fin70502/.
141. The Affordable Care Act incentivized providers to form Accountable Care
Organizations (“ACOs”)— despite their many benefits, ACOs have been criticized
for creating pressure to consolidate. Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations,
Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 14, 2015), http://khn.org/news/acoaccountable-care-organization-faq/ (“Many health care economists fear that the
race to form ACOs could have a significant downside: hospital mergers and
provider consolidation.”); Christopher Pope, How the Affordable Care Act Fuels
Health Care Market Consolidation, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 1, 2014),
https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/how-the-affordable-careact-fuels-health-care-market-consolidation. But see Hannah T. Neprash, Michael
E. Chernew, & J. Michael McWilliams, Little Evidence Exists To Support The
Expectation That Providers Would Consolidate To Enter New Payment Models, 36
HEALTH AFFAIRS 346 (2017).
142. See Virgil Dickson, Fewer Doctors are Opting
MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM
(Jan.
30,
2018),
nhealthcare.com/article/20180130/NEWS/180139995

Out of Medicare,
http://www.moder

143. Id.
144. Andrew Flowers, We May Finally Learn How Many Doctors are Opting Out of
Medicare,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT,
(March
26,
2015),
http://f
ivethirtyeight.com/datalab/data-transparency-gets-a-win-in-houses-medicarebill/.
145. See id.
146. Primary Care Physicians Accepting Medicare: A Snapshot, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(2015),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/data-note-primary-care-physiciansaccepting-medicare-a-snapshot. [hereinafter A Snap-shot]; Melinda Beck, supra
note 15.
147. See Alan Tice, Access to Care: The Physician’s Perspective, 70 HAWAII MED J. 2011,
33–38. (“One respondent indicated in the survey that they were ‘not planning to
accept any more new Medicare patients due to numerous problems with
reimbursement . . . it actually costs me to see Medicare patients when extra
administrative costs are factored in.’”).
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It is typically the small—and in-demand—physician practice groups
that can disengage from the Medicare program; if a provider is popular
enough to operate at full capacity without any Medicare patients, it might
choose to avoid the hassle. 148 The larger the provider, the more dependent
they are on Medicare patients to generate patient base, and certain
providers, like hospitals, could never opt out of Medicare. 149 The Medicaid
program has faced this problem to a much greater degree for decades. The
result: many Medicaid patients struggle to find doctors that will treat
them. 150 Not only does this raise questions about accessibility, but also
equality of care. When the most in-demand physicians refuse Medicare
patients, older populations may struggle to access the best healthcare. 151
Third, the System delays cause providers to cut services, fire
employees, and delay projects while waiting for the ALJ to return portions
of the collected overpayment. 152 The short-term deprivation of needed
funds impacts even those providers that can better manage the financial
hardship associated with the backlogs. 153 Providers of all kinds are forced
to make sacrifices—often at the expense of patients and employees—to
offset the setback. 154 For example, Baxter Regional Medical Center claimed
that it had so much money tied up in the appeals process in 2012 that it
could not “afford to replace a failing roof over its surgery department,
purchase new beds for its Intensive Care Unit, engage in other basic upkeep,
148. See A Snapshot, supra note 146 (“About two-thirds (67 percent) of primary care
physicians age 55 or older say they accept new Medicare patients compared with
about three-quarters (76 percent) of primary care physicians under age 55 (Figure
3). Younger doctors may be more likely to be building their patient caseloads and,
therefore, may be more willing to take new patients.”).
149. For instance, federal law requires hospitals to treat all individuals in need of
urgent care, and as a result, it wouldn’t make any sense for hospitals to not accept
the insurance of a patient they are required to treat. Emergency Medical
Treatment & Labor Act (EMTALA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EMTALA/
(last
visited April 1, 2018).
150. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid Payments and Access to Care, 371 N ENG. J. MED. 2345
(2014); Brigid Goody, Medicare Dependent Hospitals: Who Depends on Whom?,
14 HEALTH CARE FINAC. REV. 97, *4 (1992).
151. See Jeffrey P. Harrison & Rachel M. Barksdale, The Impact of RAC Audits on US
Hospitals, 39 J. HEALTH CARE FINANCE 1, 8 (2013); See AM. HOSPITAL ASS’N FACTS, supra
note 57.
152. See Statement from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Statement
on Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013 (Mar. 19, 2013),
https://www.aha.org/system/files/presscenter/pressrel/2013/130319-prrac.pdf.
153. RECOVERY AUDITING, supra note 1, at v-vi.
154. Medicaid Program; Recovery Audit Contractors, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,039
(Nov. 10, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 455).
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or purchase other necessary capital items.” 155 Other facilities claim that
they are forced to turn away patients, cut needed services, and eliminate
jobs to endure the short-term loss. 156 While some large providers may be
making these cuts to avoid a reduction in their profit margins, small
providers may have no other choice.
Finally, on a long-term basis, the post-payment review process in
general may cause providers to become increasingly conservative in
treatment decisions. To avoid retrospective recoupment of Medicare
payments, providers may error on the side of nonintervention for Medicare
patients to avoid the hassle of having to appeal the government’s
determination that the treatment was not medically necessary. 157
Nonintervention can harm patients when necessary care is delayed or
avoided. 158 Providers, of course, face many incentives that pull them in
different directions. For example, medical malpractice risk and
reimbursement schemes can incentivize providers to both over or
undertreat patients. 159 Overtreatment is similarly problematic because it
can expose patients to unnecessary risks and lead to overspending. 160
Though physicians are not immune to incentives, professional obligations
ethically require them to act in a patient’s best interest at all times, which
tempers this general concern. 161 It is unclear whether bureaucratic
inefficiencies associated with post-payment reviews would impact
providers’ decision making, but it’s important to be aware of the possible
risk.
The negative, systemic effects of the System’s delays are caused largely
by the financial strain small providers face: patients pay more when small
providers leave the healthcare market, have fewer choices when small
providers opt out of Medicare, and receive worse healthcare when small
providers cannot afford to maintain the facilities and services provided to
155. Complaint at 5, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014) (No.
14 Civ. 851).
156. Id. at 17; Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
157. 4 75 Fed. Reg. 69,037, 69,038. (Nov. 10, 2010).
158. See RACS: STRATEGIES TO REDUCE YOUR RISK AND SUCCESSFULLY APPEAL PAYMENT DENIALS 1,
33 (Erin Trompeter ed., 2010).
159. Michael D. Frakes, The Surprising Relevance of Medical Malpractice Law, 82 U. CHI.
L. REV. 317 (2015).
160. See Chanapa Tantibanchachai, In Survey, Doctors Say Unneeded Medical Care Is
Common, Driven by Fear of Malpractice, HUB (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://hub.jhu.edu/2017/09/06/unneeded-medical-care-hopkins-survey/.
161. AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, ACP ETHICS MANUAL SIXTH EDITION (2012), available at:
https://www.acponline.org/clinical-information/ethics-and-professionalism/acpethics-manual-sixthedition-a-comprehensive-medical-ethics-resource/acpethics-manual-sixth-edition.
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patients. This is important because the healthcare market still includes
many small providers. According to CMS, “most providers and suppliers are
small entities, either by nonprofit status or by having revenues of less than
$7.5 million to $38.5 million in any one year.” 162 To the extent that the
System’s delays disproportionately burden small providers—and that
burden negatively impacts the price and quality of healthcare—it is
important to find a remedy that aids small providers.

IV. Failed Regulatory and Legislative Solutions
CMS is aware of the delays associated with the System and, after public
pressure gathered, attempted to ease the backlog through various
mechanisms. Settlement has been the agency’s most successful tactic thus
far. In 2015, the agency settled roughly 300,000 inpatient-hospital claims
that waited for ALJ review. 163 The agency accomplished this mass
settlement by offering to settle all pending inpatient hospital claims if the
appellants would agree to pay 68 percent of the over-payment’s value at
issue in the appeal. 164 This was a popular solution: the government was able
to quickly and easily reduce the number of appeals clogging the System and
providers were able to make an informed business decision about whether
to continue waiting for the ALJ or accept the deal. In 2016, CMS announced
that it would continue the settlement program and settled additional
claims. 165
Though settlement on this scale greatly reduced—in the short-term—
the appeals backlog, there are three criticisms of this program. First, the
program has no effect on the pipeline of appeals entering the System or the
System’s capacity to hear appeals; as a result, its impact is temporary. 166
Second, the program was only offered to certain kinds of hospitals and
hospital chains; therefore, it excluded many providers, including small
162. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims and Entitlement, Medicare
Advantage Organization Determination, and Medicare Prescription Drug
Coverage Determination Appeals Procedures, 82 Fed. Reg. 4974, 5105 (proposed
Jan. 17, 2017).
163. Memorandum Opinion at 11-13, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
164. See Inpatient Hospital Reviews, CMS, http://cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Dataand-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-CompliancePrograms/Medical-Review/InpatientHospitalReviews.html (last updated June 6,
2016) [hereinafter CMS, Inpatient Hospital Reviews]; see Reed Abelson, Medicare
Will Settle Short-Term Care Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/business/medicare-will-settle-appeals-ofshort-term-care- bills.html?_r=0.
165. See CMS, Inpatient Hospital Reviews, supra note 169.
166. See e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 38 n.64 (“Although the
global settlement significantly reduced the backlog, it ended in 2015, and
therefore, will not have an effect on the current backlog.”).
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providers like physician practice groups, home health-care agencies, and
hospices. 167 Third, the structure of the settlement offer creates bad
incentives. The less confident an appellant is in the strength of its appeal,
the more likely it would be to settle. On the other hand, appellants who
believed they were likely to win on appeal—and could withstand the wait—
were more likely to reject the offer. As a result, more frivolous claims were
settled and CMS may have lost money in the long run by forfeiting portions
of valid overpayments. Finally, as explored below, the more desperate the
provider is, the more likely it will be to settle with the agency regardless of
the strength of its appeal. Large providers can therefore choose to wait if
they think they will win before an ALJ, but the more vulnerable small
providers will often be forced into settlement.
In addition to settlement, CMS also attempted to improve the backlog
through rulemaking. CMS’s rule (the “Rule”), which became effective March
20, 2017, aimed to streamline the appeals process so that its fixed budget
could resolve more appeals. 168 The Rule was issued as one prong of a threepronged approach that, if implemented in its entirety, could eliminate the
backlog by 2021. 169 The agency, however, lacks control over the two other
prongs: additional funding and legislative reforms. Both require
congressional action. 170 The agency can only create regulations aimed to
streamline the System so that it becomes more efficient, which is exactly
what the Rule aims to do. 171 The agency acknowledges that “this final rule
makes only minimal changes to the existing appeals procedures” and
therefore “[it] would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.” 172
167. See Amy Kearbey & Nicholas Alarif, CMS Announces New Settlement Initiative
Addressing Medicare Appeals Backlog, Enhancing Provider Appeal Options,
MCDERMOTTWILL&EMERY (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.mwe.com/en/thoughtleadership/publications/2018/01/cms-announces-new-settlement-initiative.
168. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5104.
169. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 10.
170. Medicare Program Changes 81 Fed. Reg. 43, 792 (emphasis added) (“(1) request
new resources to invest at all levels of appeal to increase adjudication capacity
and implement new strategies to alleviate the current backlog; (2) take
administrative actions to reduce the number of pending appeals and implement
new strategies to alleviate the current backlog; and (3) propose legislative reforms
that provide additional funding and new authorities to address the volume of
appeals.”).
171. The Rule purports to “address the Medicare appeals backlog and create
efficiencies at the ALJ level of appeal by allowing OMHA to reassign a portion of
workload to non-ALJ adjudicators and reduce procedural ambiguities that result
in unproductive efforts at OMHA and unnecessary appeals to the Medicare
Appeals Council.” Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed.
Reg. at 5104.
172. Id. at 5,105.
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The Rule’s most significant modifications to the System include
replacing ALJs with attorney adjudicators in certain circumstances. 173
OMHA will employ and train these attorney adjudicators. 174 Their decisions
would carry the same weight as ALJs, but they could rule only on issues that
do not require an evidentiary hearing. 175 This reform, though creative, is
unlikely to seriously curb the problem. By the agency’s own estimates, this
proposal would only redirect roughly 24,500 appeals per year from ALJs to
attorney adjudicators. 176 The 600,000 pending appeals heavily overshadow
that number. 177 Further, this proposal will incur additional costs as OMHA
will need to employ and compensate these attorney adjudicators, so
removing the 24,500 appeals per year will cost additional money.
Another of the agency’s reforms will give the DAB precedential
authority. 178 Unlike the current system—where ALJs and the DAB must look
at every appeal in a vacuum—the finalized proposal allows decision-makers
to build on previous decisions. 179 Precedential DAB decisions would be
published in the federal register and would be binding on the first three
levels of the System. 180 An important advantage of this reform is that
providers and Medicare contractors would receive better notice of the
agency’s interpretation of its laws such that they could better predict
decisions and conform their conduct to the rules. 181 Though the hope is that
this proposal would reduce adjudicators’ time and effort, the Rule provides
no estimate for the impact of precedential decisions. 182 This proposal is
unlikely to seriously combat the severity of the appeals backlog, especially
in the short term.

173. Id. at 4,981-82.
174. Id. at 4,983.
175. Id. at 4,982 (“[A]ttorney adjudicators [can] issue decisions when a decision can be
issued without an ALJ conducting a hearing under the regulations, to dismiss
appeals when an appellant withdraws his or her request for an ALJ hearing, and
to remand appeals for information that can only be provided by CMS or its
contractors or at the direction of the Council, as well as to conduct reviews of QIC
and IRE dismissals.”).
176. Id. at 5,104.
177. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C.
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
178. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4,977.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. See Constance B. Tobias, DAB Chair Implementing Medicare Appeals Precedent
Rule, Welcomes Suggestions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Oct. 27 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/blog/2017/10/27/medicare-appeals-precedent-rule.html.
182. Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5,104-05.
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The agency will also limit the instances in which providers can submit
new evidence in an ALJ hearing. 183 If the provider did not submit a piece of
evidence at the Reconsideration stage, the provider must show good cause
for this omission or the evidence will be excluded at later stages. 184 This
proposal could be detrimental to providers that may not be able to gather
all of the necessary evidence within the timeframe for a Reconsideration
submission. 185 And the government provides no estimate for how this
suggestion would reduce the appeals backlog. 186 Though CMS also
proposed other administrative tweaks to the System, none of them were
associated with a measurable reduction in the appeals backlog. 187
CMS estimated that its Rule would remove fewer than 30,000 appeals
per year from the System. 188 This is a disappointing figure—and one that
would only have prospective impact without affecting the current backlog
of appeals. As a result, the proposed rule alone—without corresponding
budget and legislative changes—will be insufficient. As of September 1,
2017, the agency admitted that, even presuming all of its regulatory and
settlement proposals are fully implemented, and considering all changes
the agency has made in the past few years to combat the problem, 189 the
backlog will still grow every year between FY2017 and FY2021. The current
estimate is that the appeals backlog will grow to 972,591 by FY2021 (almost
300,000 more than today). 190 The agency’s solutions are failing, and it is
impos-sible for the agency to maintain the status quo without legislative
intervention. Recognizing the limitations of regulatory solutions, the agency
has suggested two legislative proposals that it believes could solve the
problem.
The agency’s first legislative proposal was to increase OMHA’s budget.
The agency requested a 2017 budget increase of roughly $270 million
dollars for the office responsible for the ALJ and DAB appeals. 191 This budget
would have required Congress to more than double the current funding at

183. Id. at 5,043.
184. See id. at 5,045.
185. MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note 47, at 5.
186. See Medicare Program: Changes to the Medicare Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5,1045.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. For a good summary of the changes the agency has already adopted to curb the
appeals crisis, see Memorandum Opinion at 11-13, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell,
No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
190. Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C.
Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
191. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3.

296

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

a time when budgets are strapped. 192 As expected, Congress did not grant
this request, and OMHA’s budget for 2017 stayed stable at $107 million. 193
Congress also refused to grant the agency’s request for a funding increase
in 2015 and 2016. 194 The agency recently renewed its request for a
substantial budgetary increase, which the President’s budget endorsed, but
there is little evidence that Congress will adopt it. 195
Under the second legislative proposal, the agency suggested that
Congress institute legislative reforms to reduce the number of appeals
needing review. 196 The agency’s suggested legislative fix would include a
provision to shift the cost of ALJ and DAB appeals onto the recovery auditors
themselves. That is, part of the contingency fee gathered from RACs would
pay for the cost of appeals. 197 This proposal would temper the effect of the
contingency-fee arrangement: if RACs paid for the additional appeals their
audits cause, they might be more likely to avoid controversial overpayment
determinations. This suggestion, however, has never been picked up in any
proposed legislation.
Instead, in 2015, Congress proposed the Audit & Appeal Fairness,
Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act (the “AFIRM Act”), which
incorporates different legislative recommendations. 198 It is no longer
active, 199 but when the bill was introduced, it contained more controversial
reforms, such as increasing the amount-in-controversy requirement for an
ALJ hearing—from $150 to $1,500—and allowing ALJs to render decisions
without an evidentiary hearing in certain cases. 200 The AFIRM Act did not
recommend any substantive changes to the RAP program, a fact that
frustrated providers. 201 It did, however, propose to increase OMHA’s

192. Id. at 8.
193. HHS FY 2018 Budget in Brief-OMHA, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/abou
t/budget/fy2018/budget-in-brief/omha/index.html#ftno1 (last updated May 23,
2017) [hereinafter HHS FY 2018 Budget].
194. Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C.
Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
195. HHS FY 2018 Budget, supra note 193; Def. Status Report at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.
Price, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2017), ECF No. 58.
196. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE APPEALS PROCESS,
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf (last
visited March 25, 2018).
197. HHS PRIMER, supra note 3, at 9.
198. Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 2015, S. 2368,
114th Cong. (2015).
199. Id,
200. Id.
201. Id.
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budget and track the RAP reversal rates to maintain better quality control
over the program. 202
Despite Congress’s awareness of the growing problem, the AFIRM Act
sat unattended for over a year. In September 2016, D.C. District Court
discussed the AFIRM Act’s stagnancy in Congress as it reviewed a legal
challenge to System’s delays:
[I]t has been 21 months since the AFIRM Act was reported by the
Senate Finance Committee to the full Senate on December 8, 2015.
No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the Secretary offers no
evidence that any legislative action is imminent, that the bill has
support in the House of Representatives, or that the President would
sign it. 203

The court concluded that “Congress is unlikely to play the role of the
cavalry here, riding to the rescue of the Secretary’s besieged program.” 204
Two other bills modifying the RAP were introduced in 2012 and 2013 and
similarly never made it out of committee. 205
On May 23, 2017, the President released his FY2018 President’s
Budget. 206 It included a series of legislative proposals to curb the appeals
backlog. 207 First, it proposed to remand appeals back to the Redetermination stage if the appellant introduces new evidence. 208 Second, like the
AFIRM Act, it proposed to increase the amount-in-controversy requirement
to $1,560, with annual increases. 209 Third, it proposed to establish
magistrate adjudication. 210 And finally, it proposed to expedite claims that
lack material factual disputes. 211 The agency estimated that if Congress
adopted all of these proposals, the backlog would shrink to 353,603 appeals
by FY2021 (compared to the nearly one million pending appeals by FY2021
without them). 212 Nevertheless, there has been no indication from Congress
202. Id
203. Memorandum Opinion at 15, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB
(D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
204. Id. at 16.
205. Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2012, H.R. 6575, 112th Cong. (2012);
Medicare Audit Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 1250, 113th Cong. (2013).
206. Dec. of Jennifer Moughalian at 4, Am. Hosp. Ass’n. v. Price, No. 14-cv-00851 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 11, 2017)
207. Id.
208. Id. at 5.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 5-6.
212. Id. at 6.
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that it intends to act on this issue and given the current state of
Congressional gridlock, it is unlikely that Congress will step in to fix the
problem at any point in the near future.
The agency, acting in a vacuum, is largely powerless to solve the
ultimate problem. It cannot increase its budget to process more appeals per
year or reform the current programs responsible for the increasing number
of appeals entering the System. It is therefore unsurprising that CMS’s
attempted solutions—mass settlements and rulemaking—have been
largely ineffective to cause any real change.
But even if the agency cannot solve the underlying issues that created
the backlog, it can improve the financial stress providers’ face while they
wait. 213 For instance, the agency could delay its recoupment until after the
ALJ determination. The Social Security Act prevents CMS from recouping
overpayments before Reconsideration decisions. 214 CMS, however, has
discretion to delay recoupment beyond Reconsideration without violating
the Act. Through rulemaking, it could modify its own guidance to delay
recoupment. 215 This reform could make a big difference because, as
discussed above, small providers are disproportionately impacted by the
financial strain associated with the delays. As a result, this change would
particularly help small businesses endure the wait times and mitigate the
broader consequences on the healthcare market discussed in Section III. It
would also reduce the administrative cost associated with money changing
hands three times, instead of twice.
Delaying recoupment by rulemaking would not cure the problem—at
some point, Congress must dramatically change either the pipeline of
appeals or the capacity of OMHA to hear them—but it would alleviate the
harshest symptoms of this problem until legislation passed. In fact, some
small providers have sued the agency, arguing that it should be prohibited
from collecting overpayments until after the ALJ hearing, discussed in depth
below. CMS, however, has heavily resisted any effort to postpone
recoupment, claiming that it would “upset the careful balance of interests
accomplished through the present construction of the Medicare statute
213. Some regulatory solutions have been proposed in articles that were published
before—or without consideration of—providers’ recent legal victories. Kinney,
supra note 47, at 133 (suggesting an “inquisitorial system” that would allow
providers and their counsel to interact directly with reviewers); Michelle Ellis, The
Medicare Appeals Crisis: Why Mediation Is The Medicine, 16 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
61 (2016) (supporting mediation to relieve the backlog); Mary Squire, RAC: A
Program In Distress, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 219, 253-54 (2015) (proposing various
reforms); Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Procedural Triage, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 79, 108
(2017) (arguing that HHS should focus on providing full process to certain noncorporate appellants should).
214. 42 U.S.C.§1395ddd(f)(2) (2010).
215. See LIMITATION ON RECOUPMENT, supra note 87; MEDICARE OVERPAYMENTS, supra note
47.
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and regulations.” 216 But the government has not explained or substantiated
why delaying recoup-ment would financially harm the agency. 217 And the
evidence might suggest otherwise: CMS has lost as much as $17.8 million in
interest payments to Medicare providers between 2010 and 2015 because
it recouped overpayments that ultimately needed to be returned to
providers with interest. 218 Of the $17.8 million, CMS paid $13 million to
providers in 2014 and 2015 when the delays were the longest. 219
CMS has also objected to delaying recoupment because it would
increase, rather than decrease, the backlog. 220 The idea is that appel-lants
are more likely to appeal to an ALJ and endure the wait times if they are not
financially burdened while they wait. 221 But this objection misses the mark.
Providers are always incentivized to appeal their claims because the
alternative is to pay back the full amount immed-iately. 222 Regardless of
whether they appeal, CMS will recoup payments, so the practice is to
appeal everything in the hopes that some of the recoupment will be repaid.
Indeed, the government frequently laments that providers appeal every
claim regardless of its merit. 223 Because providers are already incentivized
to appeal every claim despite financial burden, delaying recoupment will
not have the impact the government claims.
CMS may dislike the idea of delayed recoupment for a more nefarious
reason: CMS can use time as a weapon once providers start to feel financial
pressure. For example, CMS can negotiate harsh settlements with providers
216. Reply Memorandum In Opposition To Preliminary Injunction at 8, D&G Holdings,
156 F. Supp. 3d. at 798.
217. Id. In another matter, the government did claim that delayed recoupment would
have “disastrous” financial implications for the Medicare Trust funds because
“CMS collects an average of $153 million in principal and $15 million in interest a
year after the second level of appeal.” Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgement at 13, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d.183. However, delaying recoupment
would not take away this revenue source, but postpone it. The government failed
to give any account for why the government would be significantly harmed by the
delay—i.e., why it needs this money in the short term. Id.
218. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 21.
219. Id.
220. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement at 13, D & G Holding, 156 F. Supp.
3d. at 798.
221. Id.
222. Jacqueline Belliveau, Can Changes to Medicare Reimbursement Appeals Reduce
Backlog?,
REVCYCLEINTELLIGENCE
(Aug
31,
2016),
https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/can-changes-to-medicarereimbursement-appeals-reduce-backlog.
223. See e.g., HHS PRIMER, supra note 84 (3), at 7 (“HHS is aware of two elements of the
existing appeals structure that appear to contribute to a growing sense among
some appellants and their representatives that appealing every claim is a good
business practice.”).
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or wait for companies to file for bankruptcy, never able to appear before an
ALJ. 224 Judge Henderson on the D.C. Circuit recently worried about this
possibility:
[B]argaining power is a two-way street. Subjecting the average
claimant to a waiting period more than eleven times longer than the
statute permits—and thereby choking off cash flow for basic
operational needs—unfairly weakens the claimant’s position, giving
it every incentive to settle for only a fraction of what it might win
after years of litigation. 225

CMS should consider delaying recoupment to ease the financial burden
on small providers—it is the only administrative remedy that could mitigate
the consequences of the System’s collapse. And if it refuses to correct this
problem itself, courts might step in to demand the same outcome.
Without real solutions on the horizon from either Congress or the
agency, providers have pursued creative ways to challenge the status quo
through federal litigation. Litigation of this sort is typically very difficult
because courts tend to dismiss unexhausted claims and defer to agencies in
the administration of their programs. But recently, courts have been willing
to consider providers’ challenges and question the government’s
conduct. 226 The next section explores these lawsuits and the impact
proposed remedies might have on small providers in par-ticular. It argues
that the best legal remedy would be to force to agency to delay
recoupment, at least until Congress is able to legislate a long-term solution.

V.

The Promise of Federal Litigation

Providers frustrated with the lack of regulatory and legislative solutions
have sued the agency in federal court. These lawsuits have largely pursued
two challenges. First, providers have brought challenges in mandamus
aimed at forcing compliance with the statutory deadlines. 227 Second,
providers have brought due process challenges aimed at delaying
recoupment until after providers have been afforded an ALJ hearing. 228 The
224. Squire, supra note 213, at 247 (“CMS is fully aware of the financial predicament
that providers confront when a large portion of their revenue faces the possibility
of termination. The agency has nothing to lose by dragging the proceedings on for
years. Many providers may be willing to settle claims for a smaller amount than
initially demanded out of a fear of losing their entire business as an alternative,
even when they believe the denials were made in error.”).
225. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 172 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
226. David Tolley and Greer Donley, A Favorable, New Climate for Challenging
Medicare Appeals, 27 MEDICARE REPORT (BNA) No. 737 (Aug. 12, 2016).
227. A writ of mandamus orders the government to comply with the law. See Am. Hosp.
Ass’n, 812 F.3d 183; see supra Sections V.A.
228. See D &G Holding, 156 F.Supp. 3d at 798; see supra Sections V.B.
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former would attempt to fix the delays without altering the agency’s
timeline for recoupment; the latter would attempt to postpone
recoupment without altering the length of the delays. These two strategies
reflect the types of providers who filed the lawsuits. The main plaintiff in
the mandamus lawsuit was the American Hospital Association (“AHA”), a
powerful lobbying organization representing a variety of facilities and
hospital systems. 229 On the other hand, small providers under threat of
bankruptcy have typically sued under the Due Process Clause. 230 AHA has
the financial capacity to withstand years of litigation as the D.C. District
Court weighs the merits. But the small provider plaintiffs have settled their
lawsuits against the agency quickly, even when the courts appeared
sympathetic to their arguments by awarding preliminary relief. 231
On December 5, 2016, the D.C. District Court granted a writ of
mandamus to force the agency to comply with its statute requiring an ALJ
hearing within ninety days. 232 The future of the writ is uncertain after the
D.C. Circuit recently questioned whether it was possible for the government
to comply with it. 233 But regardless, I argue below that mandamus is not the
proper remedy as it fails to protect small providers, especially in the shortterm. Instead, the writ may give large providers unique leverage while
negotiating with the agency, perpetuating the disproportionate harm small
providers experience. A due process remedy, on the other hand, would
protect small providers by preventing the agency from recouping a
provider’s Medicare payments before the provider has received an ALJ
determination. Removing this financial strain will help small providers
avoid bankruptcy, cut needed patient services, and resist the pressure to
consolidate with larger providers or opt out of Medicare—thus helping
healthcare consumers. This section explores the feasibility of a due process

229. About the AHA, AM. HOSPITAL ASSN., http://www.aha.org/about/index.shtml (last
visited Feb. 19, 2017).
230. Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253-JRH-GRS, 2015 WL 8488432,
at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015); D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d. at 798.
231. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La.
Apr. 26, 2016), ECF. 100; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2015), ECF No. 24.
232. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167291, at *8 (D.D.C.
Dec. 5,
2016).
233. The district court is now reconsidering its decision after the D.C. Circuit required
it to determine whether it was possible for HHS to comply with this remedy. Am.
Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017). On March 22, 2018, the district
court stayed the case for three months and ordered the plaintiff to submit specific
proposals for a mandamus order with which the government could possibly
comply. Minute Order, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, No. :14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C.
March 22, 2018), ECF No. 81.
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challenge, including the significant legal and practical hurdles providers
must overcome to litigate the issue to finality.
A.

Litigation Seeking to Force Compliance with the 90-Day Timeframe

There are many possible mechanisms to challenge the System’s delays
based on the agency’s failure to abide by the statutory mandate, including
a writ of mandamus, ultra vires, or through the Admin-istrative Procedures
Act. Requesting a writ of mandamus—a strategy AHA adopted in 2014—has
been the most successful approach, though its future is currently uncertain.
The D.C. District Court initially dismissed the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction,
but in May 2016, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded for a decision on
the merits. 234 In a strongly worded opinion, the Circuit found that it had
jurisdiction and that a writ was warranted if the legislature failed to fix
problem itself:
Taking the above factors into account, the district court—more than
a year after its first denial and with the problem only worsening—
might find it appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the
Secretary to cure the systemic failure to comply with the
deadlines . . . . Given this, and given the unique circumstances of this
case, the clarity of the statutory duty likely will require issuance of
the writ if the political branches have failed to make meaningful
progress within a reasonable period of time—say, the close of the
next full appropriations cycle. 235

This opinion came after the Fourth Circuit considered the same issue
months earlier and held it lacked jurisdiction to hear a mandamus action. 236
The D.C. Circuit’s decision revitalized providers that hoped for a legal
remedy to cure the System’s delays.
As soon as the D.C. Circuit remanded AHA to the district court, the
agency moved to stay the litigation until September 2017 so that it had
more time to fix the problem itself. 237 The district court refused to grant the
agency’s stay 238 and eventually issued a writ of mandamus, which ordered
the agency to comply with its statutory obligation to provide an ALJ hearing
within ninety days. 239 The court recognized that compliance could not be
immediate, but nevertheless required the agency to eliminate the backlog
by 2021 with incremental reductions each year—“i.e., 30% reduction from
234. Id.
235. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d at 193.
236. Cumberland Co. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2016).
237. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
238. Memorandum Opinion, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB (D.D.C.
Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
239. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167291, at *1.
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the current backlog of cases pending at the ALJ level by December 31, 2017;
60% by December 31, 2018; 90% by December 31, 2019; and 100% by
December 31, 2020.” 240
In a surprising twist, the D.C. Circuit again reversed and remanded to
the district court, finding that it failed to consider whether it was impossible
for the agency to legally comply with the writ. 241 And because the judiciary
cannot order the government to do the impossible, the district court was
required to first decide possibility. 242 The D.C. Circuit raises an important
question: how will the agency suddenly be able to drain the backlog after
attempting to do so for years with little improvement? The answer: it will
not. Judge Boasberg expressed this sentiment in his September 2016
opinion: “the Court, however, does not possess a magic wand that, when
waved, will eliminate the backlog. Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Court
simply order HHS to resolve each of the pending appeals by the statutorily
prescribed deadlines is extremely wishful thinking.” 243 But while a writ of
mandamus cannot suddenly fix the ALJ capacity problem, it pressures
Congress to act and the agency to shift priorities even more dramatically to
accommodate as many appeals as possible. After all, why should the
government’s inability to fix its broken System burden providers instead of
the government?
Settlement would be the easiest—and perhaps the only—way for the
agency to reduce the backlog and comply with the writ of mandamus.
Settlement will allow the agency to quickly reduce the number of pending
appeals without fundamentally altering the System’s procedures or the
agency’s recoupment timeline. The agency’s mass settlements have thus
far been the only improvement that has made any significant impact on the
backlog. And in December 2016, CMS decided to extend its mass settlement
program. 244 As CMS continues to feel the pressure to settle, providers may
start to gain leverage against the agency to negotiate highly favorable
settlements and dismiss their claims for a portion of the potential
overpayment. 245 The agency argued recently before the D.C. Circuit that

240. Id. at *8.
241. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 160.
242. Id.
243. Memorandum Opinion at 15, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-cv-00851-JEB
(D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2016), ECF No. 38.
244. Hospital Appeals Settlement Process 2016, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Appeals-andGrieva
nces/OrgMedFFSAppeals/Hospital-Appeals-Settlement-Process-2016.html (last
modified Jan. 17, 2017).
245. David Tolley and Greer Donley, Recent Developments in Litigation Challenging the
Medicare Appeals Delays: Is Victory Likely for Medicare Providers?, 27 MEDICARE
REPORT (BNA) No. 938 (Oct. 6, 2016).
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settlement was its only option for compliance with the writ, and that it
might be forced to settle frivolous claims at a significant loss. 246
If HHS pursues settlement to clear the backlog, it will likely reinforce
the disparity among small and large providers. Large hospital chains with
many appeals pending in the System will have more leverage with the
agency looking to dismiss a large number of claims. If they are not happy
with the agency’s offer, they can reject it knowing that they have the
financial security to wait for their hearing. Small providers appealing fewer
claims will have less leverage to negotiate favorable deals and feel more
desperate to accept any offer that will return some portion of their
recouped payment. 247 As a result, small providers can be pressured into
unfavorable settlements, while large providers can harness a writ of
mandamus to their advantage.
The AHA—a powerful organization representing both large corporate
hospital chains as well as individual facilities—has the financial capacity to
litigate the issue fully. 248 The primary remedy requested, compliance with
the 90-day statute, was not aimed at serving its most vulnerable members,
but providing broad relief. As a result, this remedy does not attempt to
relieve small providers of the burdens associated with waiting. And while it
provides needed recourse to correct the egregious delays, it cannot be the
sole solution, at least not in the short term before the backlog is fully
emptied.
B.

Litigation Seeking to Delay Recoupment Until After the ALJ Hearing

Some providers have pursued another litigation strategy: challenging
the agency’s conduct under the Due Process Clause. Unlike a mandamus
challenge, which would attempt to compel the government to act in
accordance with its statutory mandate, a procedural due process claim
would ask a court to prevent the government from recouping
overpayments until after an ALJ determination. In short, this challenge asks
the court to find that recoupment before an ALJ hearing unconstitutionally
deprives providers of their property without due process. It would not,
however, impact the length of the delays, only the burden associated with
waiting. This litigation strategy would be particularly helpful for small
providers who could thereby avoid the financial strain of erroneous
recoupment. Though two small providers have been successful at winning

246. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d at 167. The agency argued that it would be illegal
to require it to settle frivolous claims. Id.
247. Id.at 177 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (noting that a provider’s financial exigency
unfairly weakens its bargaining power).
248. About the AHA, AM. HOSP. ASS’N., http://www.aha.org/about/index.shtml (last
accessed Dec. 22, 2017).
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preliminary relief under this theory, their cases settled before the merits
could be litigated. 249
This section explores whether a due process challenge has merit and
the many legal and practical challenges that could prevent a due process
claim from being litigated to finality. If a provider could successfully and
fully litigate a due process challenge, however, it would force the agency to
do what it is refusing to do in its rulemaking: delay recoupment until after
an ALJ hearing. Without this pressure, the agency will likely continue to
refuse this needed reform.
1.

Exploring the Merits of a Due Process Claim

The first step in any due process claim is to identify the liberty or
property interest at stake—only then is due process required. 250 After
demonstrating that a constitutionally protected property interest exists,
providers must prove the government deprived them of that property
interest without due process. To make this showing, plaintiffs will need to
demonstrate that the first two levels of the System provide insufficient
procedural protections to justify a deprivation of property. This analysis
generally involves a balancing of the government’s burden in providing
additional process and the plaintiff’s harm if the additional process is
denied.
To prove that a constitutionally protected interest is at stake, plaintiffs
must show that they are entitled to payment for the services they provide
to Medicare beneficiaries. 251 The Constitution does not create property
rights; “[r]ather [property rights] are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” 252 The
Medicare statute can be read to create this entitlement, noting the
following with respect to Part A providers:
the Secretary shall periodically determine the amount which should
be paid under this part to each provider of services with respect
249. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La.
Apr. 26, 2016); Order, see Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-00253JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 24.
250. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (“But, to
determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must
look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must look
to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty
and property.”) (internal citations omitted).
251. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71 (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.”).
252. Id. at 577.
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to the services furnished by it, and the provider of services shall be
paid, at such time or times as the Secretary believes appropriate (but
not less often than monthly) . . . . 253

Perhaps the best evidence of this entitlement is the fact that CMS pays
the provider for services rendered before completing its post-payment
reviews.
Mathews v. Eldridge 254 established the modern test for evaluating
whether an agency provided due process before it affected a party’s liberty
or property interest. Mathews followed in the footsteps of Goldberg v.
Kelly—where the Supreme Court held that an agency could not deprive
individuals of their welfare benefits without first providing welfare
beneficiaries with a pre-deprivation ALJ hearing. 255 Mathews constrained
Goldberg’s holding by limiting the incidences in which agencies must
provide a pre-deprivation hearing. 256 Recognizing that such a requirement
can come with significant governmental costs, the Court created a
balancing test to weigh the various interests at stake:
[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
[2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
procedural or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail. 257

After weighing these factors in a new context—disability benefits—the
Mathews Court held that it was constitutional to deprive individuals of their
disability benefits prior to an ALJ hearing—i.e., that a pre-deprivation
hearing was not required for disability beneficiaries as it had been for
welfare beneficiaries. 258
Mathews did not overturn Goldberg. 259 Though Mathews involved a
nearly identical claim to Goldberg, the Court distinguished itself from
Goldberg on three factors. First, it found that the deprivation of welfare
benefits was more significant than the deprivation of disability benefits. 260
253. 42 U.S.C. 1395g(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
254. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
255. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
256. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342.
257. Id. at 335.
258. 43 U.S.C. § 405(5) (2017).
259. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 355.
260. Id. at 342 (“Still, the disabled worker’s need is likely to be less than that of a
welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to private resources,
other forms of government assistance will become available where the

307

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
The Broken Medicare Appeals System: Failed Regulatory Solutions and the
Promise of Federal Litigation

Second, it found that a pre-deprivation hearing in the disability context was
marginally less beneficial than in the welfare context. 261 Finally, the Court
concluded that the government’s burden in providing a pre-deprivation
hearing in the disability context was high and outweighed the beneficiaries’
interests (unlike in the welfare context). 262
To win a due process challenge, providers would need to argue that
their due process claims are more similar to Goldberg than Mathews and
that the balancing test favors them. Courts are generally reluctant to
require agencies to provide additional process. Small providers, however,
could realistically argue that this is an exceptional circumstance given the
severe financial ramifications, high likelihood of success before an ALJ, and
low governmental cost. In so doing, they might have to concede that when
the System functioned normally, it was not constitutionally deficient. 263
a.

The Severity of the Interest Affected

The severity associated with the property deprivation is a significant
part of the balancing test. In Goldberg, the Court worried that an erroneous
deprivation of welfare benefits could render beneficiaries destitute; “thus,
the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient
of the very means by which to live while he waits.” 264 Conversely, in
Mathews, the Court relied significantly on its view that an erroneous
deprivation of disability benefits would be less likely to threaten a
beneficiary’s ability to survive, stating: “still, the disabled worker’s need is
likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient . . . other forms of
government assistance will become available where the termination of
disability benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence
level.” 265 In other words, the Court reasoned that because disability
beneficiaries could obtain other forms of assistance, like welfare, if they
become destitute while waiting for an ALJ determination, they were less
termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below the
subsistence level.”).
261. Id. at 343-44 (“[A medical assessment] is a more sharply focused and easily
documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitle-ment. In
[welfare hearings], a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and
issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decision making
process.”).
262. Id. at 347-49.
263. See e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Coverage Decision-Making And Appeal
Procedures: Can Process Meet The Challenge Of New Medical Technology?, 60
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1461 (2003) (exploring due process in the Medicare Appeals
System long before the delays began in the context of challenging Medicare
coverage determinations).
264. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (emphasis added).
265. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342.
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likely to suffer extreme hardship if their disability benefits were erroneously
deprived in the meantime.
Erroneous deprivation of Medicare payments while providers wait for
an ALJ hearing forces many businesses 266 to face the corporate equivalent
of the harm announced in Goldberg: bankruptcy. 267 According to Goldberg,
when a property deprivation threatens the “very means by which to live
while [the beneficiary] waits,” the deprivation is severe. 268 There is no more
severe consequence to a business than facing dissolution as it waits for the
government to correct its erroneous deprivation. One practical implication
is that small providers genuinely facing dissolution are the best positioned
to prove the requisite level of severity under the Due Process Clause. As a
result, it is unsurprising that the two plaintiffs who have successfully raised
this claim were small providers. 269
Another factor that can impact severity is the length of the delay. 270 If
the delay is so long that a party cannot be heard “at a meaningful time,”
then the deprivation is more severe. 271 In Mathews, the Court noted that
the average wait for an ALJ hearing was between ten and eleven months.
Though the Court found that timeframe “torpid[],” it was not so severe as
to outweigh the court’s findings on the other factors. 272 The delays faced by
266. A Medicare provider’s due process challenge affects businesses as opposed to the
individuals affected in Goldberg and Mathews. Because the Supreme Court has
held on numerous occasions that corporations and business associations are
guaranteed the same Fourteenth Amendment rights as natural persons, the fact
that Medicare providers are businesses should not affect the analysis in any legally
relevant way. Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S.
181, 189 (1888) (“Under the designation of ‘person’ there is no doubt that a
private corporation is included [in the Fourteenth Amendment]. Such
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose
and permitted to do business under a particular name and have a succession of
members without dissolution.”); Nw. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906)
(“It is true, also, that a corporation of one state, doing business in another state,
under such circumstances as to be directly subject to its process at the instance of
suitors, may invoke the protection of that clause of the 14th Amendment which
declares that no state shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.’”).
267. Press Release, supra note 52. Not all healthcare providers are seriously affected
by the property deprivation. In particular, large hospital chains might be well
suited to absorb the delays. As a result, this challenge might need to be made on
an as-applied basis.
268. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 340.
269. D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 798; see Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No.
4:15-cv-0253, 2015 WL 8488432 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015).
270. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42 (quoting Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389
(1975)).
271. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
272. Id. at 341-42.
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Medicare providers are years longer than those at issue in Mathews and
grow every month. 273 Because of them, some small providers may no longer
exist by the time of their hearing, which supports the argument that they
could not be heard at a mean-ingful time.
b. The Likelihood That an ALJ Hearing Would Improve Agency Decision Making

The second factor of the Mathews analysis “is the fairness and
reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.” 274 The fundamental
inquiry is whether adding procedural protections before property
deprivation will improve the reliability of the outcomes. 275 Here, the
additional safeguard would be an ALJ hearing before recoupment. ALJs
provide two primary procedural protections that are lacking in Reconsideration and Redetermination. First, ALJ hearings provide the initial
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 276 Second, OMHA—
the agency under which ALJ hearings occur—is located under HHS, not CMS,
and its ALJs are therefore less susceptible to bias.
A fair hearing “require[s] that a recipient have . . . effective opportunity to defend themselves by confronting any adverse witnesses and by
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally.” 277 It is undisputed that
an ALJ hearing is the first point that providers can present evidence and
raise their arguments orally before an arbiter. 278 The GAO, for instance,
attributed the “high reversal rates at Level 3 [i.e., the ALJ hearing], in part,
to the opportunity for hearings and presentation of new evidence . . . ” 279
As the GAO noted, ALJ hearings “provide an opportunity for appellants to
explain the rationale for the medical treatment.” 280 For many providers, the
chance to present evidence and explain their decisions creates the
difference between an “overpayment” and valid claim.
ALJs are also the first instance in which a truly independent decisionmaker hears the appeal. When considering neutrality in the agency context,
“there is wisdom in recognizing that the further the tribunal is removed
from the agency and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the
need for other procedural safeguards.” 281 The arbiters in Reconsideration
and Redetermination are Medicare contractors employed by CMS; their
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See supra Section II.
277. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68.
278. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 22.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 23.
281. Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975).
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mission includes protecting the Medicare trust funds and identifying
potential overpayments. 282 These contractors are essentially asked to judge
a conflict where their employer is one of the parties. This creates an
incentive adverse to the providers, who want to get paid for all of the
services they provide. ALJs, on the other hand, are employed by a different
agency—OMHA— and are therefore an external arbiter that is less likely to
prioritize CMS’s interests.
One mechanism to assess whether Reconsideration and Redetermination are reliable and fair is the likelihood of a reversal before a tribunal
that provides additional process. 283 In Mathews, the Court found that ALJs
only reverse 3.3 percent of appeals involving a person’s eligibility for
disability benefits. 284 This is in stark contrast to a provider’s likelihood of
obtaining a reversal before an ALJ of their payment’s recoupment. CMS’s
2014 data indicates that 54 percent of ALJ appeals fully reversed the
underlying decision. In 2012 and 2013, ALJs overturned more than 60
percent of underlying decisions. 285 As the D.C. Circuit has stated: “if the vast
majority of these delayed [ALJ Medicare] appeals were ultimately denied,
they might amount to little more than an unfortunate nuisance. The record
suggests, however, that many have merit.” 286 This high reversal rate
indicates that Reconsideration and Redetermination are not sufficiently
protective of providers’ property interests and an additional safeguard—an
ALJ hearing—could be warranted.
c. The Government’s Conflicting Interest

The final Mathews factor to consider “is the public interest. This
includes the administrative burden and other societal costs that would be
associated with requiring, as a matter of constitutional right, an evidentiary
hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability
benefits.” 287 In Mathews, if the Court had required the government to
provide a pre-deprivation hearing before discontinuing disability benefits,
it would have forced the government to continue paying disability
beneficiaries for ten to eleven months who may have no longer been
eligible for benefits. And because the ALJ hearing almost always found for
282. MEDICARE INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 20, at 4.
283. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319, n.29 (“As we indicated last Term in Fusari v. Steinberg
[], in order fully to assess the reliability and fairness of a system of procedure, one
must also consider the overall rate of error for all denials of benefits.” )(quoting
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 383 n. 6 (1975)).
284. Id. (“Here, that overall rate is 12.2%. Moreover, about 75% of these reversals
occur at the reconsideration stage of the administrative process . . . . Netting out
these reconsideration reversals, the overall reversal rate falls to 3.3%.”).
285. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 21-22.
286. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 188.
287. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341-42.
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the government, those payments would have been erroneous 96.7 percent
of the time. 288 The Mathews Court relied heavily on the potential cost of
these erroneously paid disability benefits, most of which the government
could never recoup given the financial circumstances of the population. 289
It furthermore worried that this lost money could have been used to
provide additional benefits to qualified individuals. This final factor was
ultimately the reason the Court held that a pre-termination hearing was not
required in the disability context. 290
The cost of a pre-termination hearing for Medicare providers would be
negligible for two reasons. First, unlike disability beneficiaries who would
have been paid monthly sums as they waited for their ALJ hearing, 291
Medicare providers are challenging a past transaction that the government
paid for long before the appeal. In other words, a pre-deprivation hearing
for Medicare providers would not cost the government any additional
money given that payment had already been made. 292 Second, the agency
has a strong self-help mechanism against providers to ensure it will be paid
back: recoupment. 293 If an ALJ determines that a true overpayment has
occurred, the agency can immediately recoup the money by ceasing all
future Medicare payments to the provider. 294 This is not a remedy available
in the disability context, where beneficiaries are receiving government
assistance, not payment for services rendered. Finally, given the underlying
systemic issues that are perpetuated by these delays, it is in the public’s
interest to create a reprieve for these small providers.
Taken together, a court could find that the Mathews factors balance in
favor of small Medicare providers. Because small providers are more
severely harmed the delays than large providers and their financial risk
more seriously impacts public interest concerns, they are best positioned
to bring a successful due process challenge.
d. Early Victories Suggesting that a Procedural Due Process Challenge Could Be
Successful

Two small providers have recently been successful at obtaining preliminary relief to prevent the government from recouping their Medicare
payments before an ALJ hearing. In Hospice Savanah, the Southern District
of Georgia entered a temporary restraining order to prevent the
government from recouping a small hospice provider’s Medicare payments
288. Id. at n.29.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. 42 U.S.C. §1395ff(C) (2017) and MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 84, at 14.
292. 42 U.S.C. §1395ff(D) (2017).
293. Id.
294. Id.
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prior to an ALJ hearing. 295 The court found that the plaintiff was likely to
succeed on the merits and be irreparably harmed if the recoupment were
not enjoined because “Hospice Savannah will lose 80% of its total revenues
and be . . . forced to close.” 296
In a similar case a few months later, D&G Holdings, the Western District
of Louisiana granted a preliminary injunction preventing CMS from
recouping overpayments before the ALJ decision: 297
[P]laintiff states that if it is not granted a timely administrative
hearing and recoupment continues in the interim, it will lose the
same amount of revenue, will go out of business, could not care for
its rural customer base, and must terminate its employees . . . . These
are damages not recompensable through retroactive payment. A
colorable claim that irreparable harm will result has been made. 298

Both cases settled shortly after the injunctions were issued and were
therefore not litigated fully on the merits. 299 Nevertheless, both providers’
preliminary victories demonstrate that a due process chall-enge could be
ultimately victorious, as the decisions were based on findings that, inter
alia, the providers were likely to be successful on the merits.
2.

Legal and Practical Challenges Associated with a Due Process Challenge

Despite the possibility that a due process challenge could be successful
and provide a unique remedy to providers, plaintiffs would need to
overcome significant legal and practical hurdles. I explore three of the more
pressing obstacles below. Though the legal hurdles are surmountable, the
practical challenges will make it difficult to litigate the challenge to finality.
a.

Jurisdiction

Providers seeking to bring a due process challenge will face a
jurisdiction hurdle right out of the gate. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precludes federal
jurisdiction prior to administrative exhaustion for claims “arising under”
federal statutes, including the Medicare Act, and that base their jurisdiction
on the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 300 Under Section 405(h),
295. MEDICARE APPEALS SYSTEM, supra note 80, at 13.
296. Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15-cv-0253-JRH-GRS, 2015 WL 8488432,
at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2015).
297. D&G Holdings, 156 F. Supp. 3d. at 817.
298. Id. at 817.
299. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La. Apr.
26, 2016), ECF No. 99; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell,. No. 4:15-cv00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 24.
300. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2006); Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002, 1010 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 2005); Randall D. Wolcott, MD, P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir.
2011). The Administrative Procedures Act does not grant jurisdiction.
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providers are generally prohibited from bringing federal litigation to
challenge Medicare appeals before completing all four of the System’s
steps. 301 This requirement would be quite problematic for those providers
that risk bankruptcy while waiting for the delayed ALJ hearing. The provider
might no longer be in business by the time it has exhausted and can litigate
the due process claim in federal court.
Fortunately, providers should be able to avoid this obstacle to a due
process challenge. First, litigants challenging due process can avoid Section
405(h) by arguing that their claim is entirely collateral to the underlying
substantive appeal (i.e., that challenging the System’s delays is unrelated to
whether or not the provider is entitled to payment for the underlying
service). 302 Second, the administrative appeals process may be bypassed—
and federal question jurisdiction invoked—if exhaustion would amount to
“no review at all” of the claim. 303 Providers could argue that this exception
is met because they cannot challenge the System’s delays within the System
itself, and they may no longer exist to challenge the delays in federal court
if required to first exhaust.
Both of these exceptions to Section 405(h) involve a high bar; 304
nevertheless, the D&G court allowed the plaintiff to bypass 405(h) under
the collateral claim exception. 305 The court held that a “ruling on the merits
of Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim will involve this Court in no way
with a determination of whether Plaintiff was overpaid by Medicare, to
301. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2006).
302. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 330; see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467,482
(1986); V.N.A. of Greater Tift Cty. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020, 1032 (11th Cir. 1983)
(“Eldridge suggests strongly that there is room for a wholly collateral procedural
attack, for example, to compel agency action wrongfully withheld. In other words,
to the extent that a provider could show that a delay during PRRB review is
contrary to the statute, it might well have a cause of action.”) (internal citation
omitted); Crawford & Co. v. Apfel, 235 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We need
not address whether jurisdiction is present under § 405(g), as we conclude, after
reviewing the briefs of the parties, that the precedential authority of this circuit
establishes that the judgment of the district court, even if not “final” per se, is
reviewable under the collateral order doctrine . . . ”); St. Louis Univ. v. Blue Cross
Hosp. Serv., 537 F.2d 283, 291 (8th Cir. 1976).
303. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 529 U.S. 1, 19 (2000) (“[The Medicare
Act] does not apply § 405(h) where application of § 405(h) would not simply
channel review through the agency, but would mean no review at all.”); BP Care
v. Thompson, 398 F.3d 503, 508 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Put another way, “parties
affected by Medicare administrative determinations may sue in federal court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, bypassing § 405 preclusion, only where requiring agency
review pursuant to § 405(h) would mean no review at all.”).
304. See e.g., Triple a Home Care Agency v. Burwell, No. 4:15CV668 JCH, 2016 WL
728334, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2016) (holding that plaintiff provide could not
meet the collateral claim doctrine because it sought review of the underlying
overpayment determination, which was not “collateral.”).
305. D&G Holdings, 812 F. Supp. 3d. at 798.
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what degree any overpayment was made, or the suitability of the statistical
extrapolation used to assess Plaintiff’s alleged overpayment.” 306 The court,
however, was unpersuaded by the “no review at all” exception, holding that
the exception required a showing of legal impossibility, which the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate. 307
b.

Property Interest

Assuming the court finds jurisdiction, plaintiffs will also face negative
precedent in proving that a potential overpayment constitutes a
constitutionally recognized property interest. 308 Providers have historically
been unsuccessful in lodging due process claims against the government. 309
In particular, courts have not been willing to find a property interest in
future Medicaid or Medicare payments that are recouped, frozen, or
withheld based on findings of potential Medicare fraud. 310 No court,
however, has examined whether the government’s recoupment of
previously distributed Medicare payments based not on fraud, but a
potential overpayment constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of
property. Though not an easy question, I contend that once the government
transfers possession of the payment to the provider, the property interest
in the payment shifts from the government to the provider.
306. Id. at 815.
307. Id. Arguably, exhaustion could involve a legal impossibility: by the time a provider
reaches federal court after exhausting the four steps in the System, it no longer
has standing to challenge the delays because it is no longer being affected by
them.
308. Providers could also attempt to prove that a constitutionally protected liberty
interest is at stake when the government threatens providers’ ability to continue
their chosen profession. Mary Squire proposed that a constitutionally protected
liberty interest can be implicated when a Medicare provider faces bankruptcy as
a result of agency action. Squire, supra note 213, at 240-42. However, this theory
is even less supported. The fact that providers have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest to pursue their chosen profession does not mean that government
action threatening their ability to stay in business impinges on that interest, see
James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and
Policy Analysis, 59 TEX L. REV. 1345, 1390-91 (1981).
309. See e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1975); Karnak Educ.
Trust v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 1517, 1519-20 (11th Cir. 1987).
310. ABA v. D.C., 40 F. Supp. 3d 153, 167 (D.D.C. 2014) (“In contrast to a provider’s right
to participate in the Medicaid program, there is no constitutional right to receive
Medicaid payments.”); Personal Care Products v. Hawkins, 635 F.3d 155, 159 (5th
Cir. 2011) (“Nothing in Texas or federal law extends a property right in Medicaid
reimbursements to a provider that is the subject of a fraud investigation.”);
Clarinda Home Health v. Shalala, 100 F.3d 526, 531 (8th Cir. 1996) (“we hold that
it is not a violation of due process to temporarily withhold Medicare payments
during an ongoing investigation for acts of fraud.”); Chaves County Home Health
Service v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Yorktown Med. Lab. v.
Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1991)..
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The Medicare statute clearly creates a right to payment, but the
question is whether that right is dependent on the claim successfully
passing through post-payment review. 311 The statute and regulations
governing overpayments complicate the issue because they create
procedures by which the government can recoup payments that it has
already made. 312 Those procedures, however, do not necessarily define the
property interest—if they did, then the legislature (as opposed to the
Constitution) would be designating the scope of due process. The Supreme
Court has found this impermissible. 313 The legislature creates property
interests, but federal courts define the scope of the Consti-tution’s due
process protection. 314 The Supreme Court described this distinction in
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill by stating: “the categories of substance
and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be
reduced to a mere tautology. ‘Property’ cannot be defined by the
procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty.” 315
The Loudermill court explicitly rejected Justice Rehnquist’s view in Arnett v.
Kennedy 316 that when a legislature grants a substantive right, plaintiffs must
accept the limitations placed upon it. 317 Thus, the fact that the government
can review and recoup Medicare payments after they are made to
providers does not mean that the property interest does not vest at the
time of payment.
311. 42 U.S.C. 1395g(a) (2010) (“the Secretary shall periodically determine the amount
which should be paid under this part to each provider of services with respect to
the services furnished by it, and the provider of services shall be paid, at such time
or times as the Secretary believes appropriate (but not less often than
monthly) . . . .”) (emphasis added). The statute creates prepayment conditions
before payment is made, not post-payment conditions see 42 U.S. Code § 1395f.
(2010).
312. The statute and provider agreements are not silent about overpayments. The
statute permits “necessary adjustments on account of previously made
overpayments or underpayments.” 42 U.S.C.§1395g(a) (2010). The right to collect
overpayments is also provided in the agreement signed when providers apply to
become a Medicare provider. One provision requires providers to agree that “any
existing or future overpayment made to the provider by the Medicare program
may be recouped by Medicare through the withholding of future payments.” CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ENROLLMENT APPLICATION 48 (2011),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMSForms/downloads/cms855a.pdf.
313. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
314. See id.
315. Id.
316. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-154 (1974) (“where the grant of a
substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures
which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of
appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.”).
317. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
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Linking a provider’s property interest in Medicare payments with the
transfer of property is a plausible interpretation of the Medicare statute. 318
And once the property interest has been created, only the courts can decide
under what circumstances that interest can be deprived. Under this theory,
the government could still recoup previously distributed Medicare
payments, but only after first providing sufficient process: an ALJ hearing.
c.

Practical Implications

A final hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome to achieve a victory on the
merits of a due process challenge is to avoid the pressure to settle. The
plaintiffs in both D&G and Hospice Savannah settled their lawsuits as soon
as they earned preliminary relief. 319 CMS was motivated to settle so that it
could avoid thhe possibility of negative precedent on the merits that would
force it to delay recoupment for all providers. The plaintiffs, facing
insolvency and anxious to reduce the burden of recoupment, were not in a
financial position to reject a favorable settlement and continue their
lawsuit. Of course, it is the very fact that small providers face the threat of
bankruptcy that makes their due process claim possible—the interest
affected is severe enough to tilt the Mathews balance in their favor. CMS
can use this reality to its benefit by essentially buying out successful
plaintiffs before the merits are reached.
AHA did not face this same financial pressure and was able to endure
years of litigation before ultimately winning a writ of man-damus. It was
also not suing as an individual provider hoping to win a good result for itself,
but as an organization using an impact litigation strategy to win a good
result for its members. The AHA lawsuit represented a unique case in which
private parties were able to use litigation to pressure a reluctant agency to
act. A similar outcome based on a due process remedy is possible, so long
as a plaintiff can resist the pressure to settle.

VI. Conclusion
The Medicare Appeals System is broken. It cannot accommodate the
influx of appeals that are entitled to ALJ review. Despite the government’s
failure to meet its statutory deadlines, CMS continues to recoup payments
on schedule as if the delays are not occurring. This places an extreme
burden on providers, whose Medicare payments are recouped while they
318. This interpretation also has some support in recent case law see ABA, 40 F.Supp.3d
at 167 (distinguishing itself from Chaves County Home Health Service, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 1991) on the grounds that the Chavez
plaintiffs “asserted the right to retain payments already made, circumstances
entirely different than those presented here,” noting that “providers had a
property interest in the monies they had received.”).
319. See Order, D&G Holdings, LLC v. Burwell, No. 5:15-cv-02624-EEF-MLH (W.D. La.
Apr. 26, 2016), ECF No. 99; see Order, Hospice Savannah, Inc. v. Burwell, No. 4:15cv-00253-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2015), ECF No. 24.
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wait years for ALJ hearing, which is more likely than not to determine that
the recoupment was erroneous. Small providers in particular cannot
accommodate the years-long deprivation of their recouped Medicare
payments. Legislative and regulatory solutions have failed thus far.
Litigation appears to be the only source of imminent progress for providers.
Though providers were initially able to obtain a writ of mandamus, a
successful due process challenge would better protect small providers, who
may be otherwise forced to face insolvency, sell their businesses to larger
companies, opt out of Medicare, or cut patient services to avoid the
financial strain associated with the delays.
The ultimate solution to the backlog requires congressional action.
Congress must decide to fund additional ALJs to accommodate the influx of
appeals or alter the pipeline of appeals entering the System. At this point,
Congress seems unmotivated to do either. Litigation is particularly
promising because it exerts pressure on the government to enact lasting
reforms. However, if the current legal remedy—mandamus—remains in
effect, it will perpetuate the disproportionate burdens small providers
experience and therefore fail to help the most vulnerable victims of the
System’s delays. Though the agency has rulemaking authority to relieve
some of the pressure on small providers by delaying recoupment, it has
been unwilling to do so. A due process challenge would force the
government to implement this change, but the litigating plaintiff must first
overcome numerous legal and practical obstacles. It might, however, be
small providers’ best chance at ob-taining relief while they wait for
Congress to act.
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